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In the Shadows of the Government:  
Relationship Building during Political Turnovers 
 
 
Abstract  
We document that following a turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms 
(especially private firms) headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending.” 
Both the instrumental-variable-based results and heterogeneity analysis are consistent with the 
interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with local governments. Moreover, 
local political turnover in a city tends to be followed by changes of Chairmen or CEOs of 
state-owned firms that are controlled by the local government. However, the Chairmen or CEOs 
who have connections with local government officials are less likely to be replaced. 
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1. Introduction    
Government plays an important role in any modern economic system. In western-style democracy, it is 
well understood that firms try to influence policymaking via lobbying and other activities that can result 
in what is known as “regulatory capture” (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Laffont and Tirole, 1991).1 
Lobbying is regulated, and thus firms are required to report their lobbying activities to regulatory agencies 
(e.g., in the US, Federal Election Commission). As a result, researchers have used lobbying and 
legislative data to study the extent of and the impact of lobbying.2  
It is well recognized that the relationship with government plays an even more critical role for firms 
in emerging markets where the government casts a big shadow on the firms’ operations. Politically 
connected firms may enjoy benefits such as preferential access to external financing, lower financing 
costs, receiving government contracts and bailouts, tax benefits, subsidies, favorable policies and 
legislative conditions, all of which can enhance their operations and increase their values (Fisman, 2001; 
Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). However, much less is 
known about how firms “invest” in their relations with governments in emerging markets where the rules 
of political lobbying are less well-established. This may be partly due to the difficulty in measuring 
relationship building, because such activities are not clearly regulated. In this paper, we attempt to fill this 
gap by examining how firms invest in their relationships with local governments in China following the 
turnovers of local politicians using a large, partially hand-collected, panel dataset.  
As the largest emerging economy, China is a particularly important country to study how firms 
interact with the government outside of western-style democracies. As forcefully argued in Xu (2011), the 
institutional foundation for Chinese economic reform can be characterized as a Regionally Decentralized 
Authoritarian (RDA) regime. RDA is a combination of political centralization and economic regional 
decentralization. National government maintains strict control over the political and personnel governance 
                                                             
1 Zingales (2017) argued and provided anecdotal evidence that powerful firms have incentives to influence politics, and to gain 
political power in order to become more powerful in the marketplace by changing the rules of games.  
2 For example, according to the Center of Responsive Politics, individuals, firms, and trade associations in the United States spend 
more than $3 billion each year to hire professional lobbyists to influence policy-making. Kang (2016) studied the returns to 
lobbying for firms in the energy sector in the United States. 
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structure in that the appointment and promotion of subnational government officials are controlled by the 
central government; yet regional governments, namely, provinces, cities/municipalities and counties, have 
overall responsibility for initiating and coordinating reforms, providing public services, and making and 
enforcing laws within their jurisdictions.  
This fundamental institutional feature of China suggests that firms are likely to build relationships 
with local government officials who have the jurisdiction over them. We thus conjecture that after 
political turnovers of local government officials, firms might use “perk spending,” namely, travel 
expenses, business entertainment expenses, overseas training expenses, board meeting expenses, company 
car expenses, and meeting expenses, to invest in the connections with their local governments. After 
political turnovers, firms may face the risk of losing existing connections and being adversely affected by 
new government policies introduced by the new local government officials. This gives them an extra 
incentive to build relations. Moreover, it is relatively easy for firms to disguise relation-building expenses 
as productivity-related perk spending. For example, Cai et al. (2011) argue that Chinese executives 
commonly use perks, such as meals, entertainment, and travel (ETC), to network with government 
officials, suppliers, clients, and creditors. Therefore, our first hypothesis is that firms would increase their 
perk spending to invest in political connections after political turnovers in their local governments.  
Moreover, the connection with local governments can be established through personnel changes at 
the firms, e.g., replacing senior management by people with connections to the new local government 
officials. This mechanism is likely to be more important for state-owned enterprises, which have weaker 
incentive for profit maximization and face stronger influences from their local governments. Hence, our 
second hypothesis is that state-owned firms, particularly those controlled by their local governments, tend 
to change their key personnel (Chairmen or CEOs) following the local political turnover.  
China’s capital market provides an ideal setup for testing these hypotheses. First, the Chinese 
economy is known as a relational economy. Guanxi is crucial for firms to do business when their 
contracts and property rights are not well protected by formal institutions (Xin and Pearce, 1996; Tsang, 
1998; Allen et al., 2005). Among the different kinds of guanxi, political connections are among the most 
important (Shih et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Piotroski and Zhang, 2014)). Second, perk expenses and 
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senior management changes are disclosed by publicly listed Chinese firms, making the measurement 
possible. Third, there are frequent political turnovers in local Chinese governments because the central 
government has a policy of appointing new political leaders in each city every several years to incentivize 
career politicians and prevent local officials from building up too much power. In our sample period of 
2003-2014, there are 1,123 city government official turnovers, with significant variations across regions 
and over time.3  
We document that, when a new Party Secretary, or a mayor, takes office in a city, the publicly-listed 
firms in that city increase their “perk spending,” after controlling for local economic conditions such as 
local GDP and population growth. The increase in perk spending does not appear to be due to the changes 
in local economic environment,  the changes in the firms’ business investment, or due to changes in their 
main customers and suppliers. This effect is also economically significant. In the year after a new mayor 
or Party Secretary is appointed, on average, a local firm in the city increases its perk spending by about 
2.98 million RMB, which is about 18% of the average annual perk spending.  
Although this result is consistent with our hypothesis, it could also be driven by omitted variables 
that affect both political turnovers and perk spending. To address this concern, we construct instrumental 
variables based on the officials’ age and tenure in the previous year. The idea is that the likelihood for an 
official to leave his or her current position increases with his or her age and the number of years since the 
appointment to the current position. There is no obvious reason why officials’ age and tenure directly 
affect future perk spending. Our estimates based on these instruments suggest that political turnovers 
cause an increase in perk spending by local firms.  
We are fully aware that our evidence is circumstantial. We find that firms increase their perk 
spending after political turnovers, but we do not have direct evidence that the increased perk spending is 
used for building up relations with local governments. Hence, to shed further light on our interpretation, 
we examine the cross-sectional and time series heterogeneity in the effect of local political turnover on 
perk spending. In particular, we find that perk spending increases more when the incentive to build 
                                                             
3 The distributions of the city-level government official turnover by province and year is provided in Table 1 in the Online 
Appendix. 
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relations with the local government is stronger. For example, when the new Party Secretary or mayor is 
originally from a different city, local firms presumably have fewer existing connections with the incoming 
official and need to invest more to build up their relations. Also, when the incoming official is young, the 
relation is perhaps more valuable, since the official is expected to be in power for longer and is more 
likely to be promoted, leading to more perk spending. For firms whose senior management has no 
political experience, or for private firms, we also find stronger increases in perk spending when new local 
government officials are appointed. Moreover, we find that the perk spending appears to respond less to 
political turnovers when it is costlier for officials to accept perks from local firms. For example, after the 
18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, President Xi Jinping’s unprecedented 
anti-corruption campaign might have made officials more reluctant to accept perks due to the elevated 
risk of being disciplined. Similarly, after a recent arrest of a local politician in a city, the incoming 
officials would become more reluctant to accept perks. These variations in the effect of political turnover 
on perk spending lend further support to our interpretation that the increase in perk spending is to build 
relations with local governments. 
What do firms get in return for their perk spending? We find that firms with more perk expenses get 
more future benefits from the local government in the form of government subsidies or accesses to 
financing, especially long-term financing. This effect is also stronger after political turnovers, which is 
consistent with our interpretation that relation building is more valuable after political turnovers. However, 
we do not find evidence that firms with more perk expenses have better future performance as measured 
by return of assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). One possible interpretation is that firms’ perk 
expenses are mostly a “rat race”, that is, firms build relations with the local government just to avoid 
falling behind other firms, but they do not get ahead of other firms when firms are all doing the same 
thing. Another possibility is that more government subsidies are simply wasted on perks or tunneled to 
become private benefits of firms’ managers, and that the better financing terms are wasted on inefficient 
investment project. 
To test our second hypothesis, we examine firms’ personnel changes during political turnovers, and 
obtain two main results. First, we find that local political turnovers tend to be followed by more changes 
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of chairmen or CEOs for firms in that city. This result is primarily driven by the changes at firms that 
local politicians can influence, such as state-owned enterprises controlled by the city. This effect 
disappears when we conduct the tests on private firms or on SOEs controlled by the central government. 
Second, consistent with the interpretation that appointed CEOs or chairmen are likely to be “friends” of 
current local government officials, we find that they are less likely to be replaced as long as the officials 
who appointed them are still in office.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on how firms build relations with their governments. Prior 
literature finds that firms can build political connections through a wide range of means including hiring 
executives with prior political experiences and/or government affiliations (Fan et al., 2007; Akey, 2015), 
contributing to electoral campaigns (Claessens et al., 2008; Cooper et al., 2009; Ovtchinnikov and 
Pantaleoni, 2012; Akey, 2015), lobbying (Borisov et al., 2016), and corporate investment (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2003; Aggarwal et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013). Our paper differs from theirs in that we focus 
on an important emerging economy – China, and that we examine how firm perk spending is used as a 
means to build political networks with governments and how such perk spending affects firm 
performance. Furthermore, we find that another important aspect of relationship building is perhaps 
through personnel changes: local political turnovers tend to be followed by more changes of Chairmen or 
CEOs for firms in that city. 
Our study also adds to the literature that examines the effects of political turnovers on corporate 
decisions, such as investments (e.g., Julio and Yook, 2012; An et al., 2016), tax avoidance (Chen et al., 
2015), and cash holding (Xu et al., 2016). Our evidence suggests that firms respond to political turnovers 
by increasing perk spending to building up connections to local governments.  
The existing literature has two opposite views on the role of perk spending. One view is that perks 
are a way for executives to misappropriate some of the surplus the firm generates (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1986; Yermack, 2006). The contrasting view is that perks are offered to incentivize 
executives to enhance managerial productivity, and thus is part of the optimal incentive contracts (Fama, 
1980; Rajan and Wulf, 2006; Marino and Zábojník, 2008). We add to these studies by providing yet 
another role played by perks: building networks with government officials.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we develop our main hypothesis; in 
Section 3 we present the data and discuss our empirical design; in Section 4 we report our main empirical 
results; in Section 5 we perform additional analysis that suggests newly inducted local politicians also 
tend to replace the CEOs and chairmen of the local SOEs under their control; and in Section 6 we 
conclude. 
 
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1. Institutional background 
There are five levels of government hierarchy in China: the central government, and the four levels of 
local governments: the provincial level, the city/municipality level, the county level, and the town level. 
Our analysis focuses on the city level. According to the 2014 China City Statistical Yearbook, there are 
297 cities across 31 provinces and four centrally administrated cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing). The top two leaders at the city level are the city’s Communist Party Secretary and the mayor, 
reflecting the dual presence of the Communist Party and the government at each level of China’s political 
hierarchy (Li and Zhou, 2005). City official turnover is under the control by the Organization Department 
of the Provincial Party Committee. Typically, a city official’s term is five years, and his/her turnover 
occurs around the meetings of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China.4 
However, many city officials do not complete the five-year terms and leave for other positions. For 
example, in the first year of a term, an official has around 20% chance of leaving his/her position. This 
conditional probability increases steadily over the official’s tenure. In the fifth year, for example, an 
official has a 60% chance of leaving his position.5   
                                                             
4 Regarding city officials’ tenure, the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
issued the “Provisional Regulations on Terms of Cadres of the Party and Government” in August 2006, which states that mayors 
and officials at the county level and above should serve five-year terms and that these terms should be relatively stable. An added 
regulation also stipulates that cadres may not serve in the same position for more than two terms (Article 6) and may not serve in 
positions of the same rank for more than 15 years (Article 7). 
5 See Table 3B in the Online Appendix for details. 
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2.2. Hypothesis  
Given the importance of political connections in the Chinese economy, it is natural to expect that firms 
may find it valuable to invest in the relations with their local governments. Our overarching hypothesis is 
that firms would increase their investment in political connections after major political turnovers in their 
local governments. First, firms may want to increase their investment in relations after political turnovers 
because this is the time when they may need to establish new connections rather than simply maintaining 
their existing ones since their existing connections lose value due to the turnover. Moreover, connections 
with new leaders are more valuable because they are expected to be in power for longer. Finally, new 
officials might make new policies that alter the business environment where firms operate (Gulen and Ion, 
2016). Thus, firms face the risk of being adversely affected by new government policies, and hence are 
more eager to build connections with local governments after new officials take offices.  
Given the opaque nature of the investment in government relations in emerging economies, we 
attempt to measure it indirectly. Adithipyangkul et al. (2011) and Cai et al. (2011) argue that Chinese 
executives commonly use “perks,” such as meals, entertainment, and travel (ETC), to network with 
government officials, suppliers, clients, and creditors. These networking activities help executives build 
their relational capital to facilitate their firms’ activities. Yeung and Tung (1996) suggest that the buildup 
and maintenance of guanxi requires perk spending. Moreover, the compensation of Chinese officials is 
generally low relative to that in other countries and relative to that in the private sector in China.6 
Officials might be motivated to seek alternative compensation in monetary and non-monetary forms. Perk 
expense of local firms may be a convenient way for officials to extract rents due to their opaque nature. 
These illegitimate expenses are commonly reimbursed as management expenses in Chinese accounting 
practice (Cai et al., 2011). Vast anecdote evidence shows that this is a common practice in China.7 
                                                             
6 On April 29, 2013, the International Business Times reported that Xi Jinping, China’s president, made US$19,000 a year 
(compared to US President Barack Obama’s US$400,000 a year).  
7 Car expenses: Due to the regulation of prohibiting using government cars for private purposes, government officials tend to use 
cars provided by firms. See, for example, China Enterprise News, April 9, 2013. 
http://news.163.com/13/0409/07/8S0KPDP20001124J.html; Travel expenses: 3 AVON senior Chinese executives were suspected 
of supporting government officials’ oversea travelling, which was classified as travelling costs in the firm’s balance sheet, 
http://news.163.com/10/0414/07/647DQROL000146BD.html; Business entertainment expenses: The entertainment expenses, 
including eat and drink, for government officials are usually paid by firms, (see, e.g., 
http://news.163.com/15/0513/18/APH1K5DS00014JB5.html. 
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Moreover, the investment in the government relation may manifest itself through personnel changes. 
For example, after a political turnover at a local government, firms’ senior management may be replaced 
by people with connections to the new local government officials. State-owned enterprises are more likely 
to adopt this approach perhaps because they have weaker incentive for profit maximization and face 
stronger influences from their local governments. 
3. Data 
Our sample consists of firms that are listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange in China from 2003 to 2014. Our sample starts in 2003 because few firms disclosed their perk 
expenses before 2003. We manually collect perk expense data from firms’ annual reports. The rest of the 
financial data are from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. 
Macro-economic statistics at the provincial and city levels are from the National Bureau of Statistics 
(NBS). We also manually collect the information on the executives from the firms' prospectuses and 
annual reports.  
To measure local political turnovers, we manually collect the detailed information on mayors and city 
level Party Secretaries such as their names, positions, tenure terms, ages, and résumés from city 
government official websites. These résumés also contain detailed personal information such as education 
and work experience prior to their current positions. If the information is not available on the official 
website, we then manually search the information through Baidu (www.baidu.com), China's most popular 
search engine. We then merge officials' personal data with firm-level perk spending and financial data by 
matching the province, city, and fiscal year. We classify a firm into a city according to the location of its 
corporate headquarter. We exclude firms in the financial industry. Our sample has 7,935 firm-year 
observations. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 1% level in 
both tails. In our analyses, the sample size may vary due to missing values in some key variables in 
different regression models. 
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3.1. Political Turnover  
To measure the major personnel change in a city, we construct a dummy variable Inductionc,t, which is 1 if 
a new mayor or Party secretary takes office in city c between July 1 of year t-1 and June 30 of year t, and 
0 otherwise.8 That is, if an official takes office between January 1 and June 30 in year t, we treat year t as 
his first year in power. If an official takes office between July 1 and December 31 in year t, then we treat 
year t+1 as his first year in power.   
3.2. Perk Spending  
In the “Footnotes to Financial Statements” section of the annual reports, firms disclose the content of 
“other cash flows related to operating activities”, from which we identify possible items related to perk 
spending. We follow Adithipyangkul et al. (2011), Gul et al. (2011) and Xu et al. (2014) to calculate the 
overall perk spending. Specifically, we construct our main measure, Perk6, by aggregating the following 
six items: travel expenses, business entertainment expenses, overseas training expenses, board meeting 
expenses, company car expenses, and meeting expenses. Then, we construct the following measures, 
Ln_Perk6, Perk6_Rev and Perk6_Asset, where Ln_Perk6 is the logarithm of Perk6; Perk6_Rev and 
Perk6_Asset are Perk6 normalized by the firms’ revenues and assets, respectively. After merging the perk 
spending data with political turnover data, we can use three subscripts to describe the perk spending. For 
example, Perk6i,c,t refers to the perk spending of firm i, whose headquarter is in city c, during year t.  
As robustness checks, we also constructed two alternative measures of the aggregate perk spending. 
Following Cai et al. (2011), we calculate “Entertainment and Travel Cost”, ETC for short, as the sum of 
three items: travel expenses, business entertainment expenses, and company car expenses. Following 
Chen et al. (2016), we construct the perk spending measure, Perk8, as the sum of Perk6 and two other 
items, work-related expenses and communication expenses.  
[Table 1 About Here] 
                                                             
8 In Table 5A of the Online Appendix, we report results using an alternative definition of “induction” that accounts for the month 
of the new leaders’ appointment: If a mayor or a secretary in city c takes office in month m of year t, then his/her Induction_newc,t 
equals (12-m+1) / 12, while Induction_new c,t+1 equals (m-1) / 12 in year t+1. The results are similar. 
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics for our sample. One average, a firm’s perk spending is about 
0.736% of its revenue. Its standard deviation is 1.122%, suggesting that there is significant cross-sectional 
variation across firms. Firms at the 75% quantile have nearly 4 times more perk spending relative to their 
revenues (0.803%) than those at the 25% quantile (0.202%). The average perk size is about RMB 16.774 
million per firm–year in our sample, with an inter-quartile range of about RMB 3.010 million (25th 
percentile) to RMB 14.175 million (75th percentile).  
The mean of Induction is 0.370, which indicates that about 37% of firm-year observations in our 
sample period experience at least one major personnel change in their local city governments. In Table 2, 
we report the correlation matrix of the main variables, with Spearman’s rank-order (respectively, 
Pearson’s linear) correlations reported in the upper-right (respectively, bottom-left) part of the matrix. We 
can see that political turnover and perk spending are positively correlated. Specifically, the Spearman’s 
rank-order correlation between Induction and Perk6_Rev is approximately 0.045, and it is highly 
significant at the 1% level.  
[Table 2 about Here] 
 
 
4. Political Turnover and Perk Spending 
4.1. Panel regressions 
To examine the effect of political turnover of key city government officials (Party Secretary or mayor) on 
perk spending of firms in the city, we first run the following panel regression: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾 × 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡                (1) 
where Perki,c,t is a measure of perk spending of firm i, which is headquartered in city c, in year t. 
Inductionc,t is a dummy variable, which is one if there is a change of mayor or Party Secretary in city c 
during year 𝐼; and 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 includes a list of firm-level, CEO-level and regional-level control variables.9  
                                                             
9 In the online appendix (Table 5B), we also attempted to differentiate the effects of the induction of Party Secretary and mayor 
separately. We find that the effects of induction on perk spending are quantitatively similar for the new mayors and new Party 
Secretaries. We also tried an alternative definition of induction of the Party Secretary recognizing that sometimes Party Secretary 
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Firm-level control variables include the following. FirmSizei,c,t is the natural log of the book value of 
the total assets of firm i, which is headquartered in city c, in year t. Leveragei,c,t is the debt to asset ratio, 
ROAi,c,t (Return on Asset) is the net income divided by total assets. Duali,c,t is a dummy variable which is 
one if the board chairman is also the CEO, and zero otherwise. InDiri,c,t is the independence of the board, 
measured as the ratio of the number of independent directors over the total number of directors on the 
board. SOEi,c,t is one if the firm is a state-owned enterprise and zero otherwise. InsHoldPeri,c,t is the 
percentage of the shares owned by institutions. DirHoldingi,c,t is the percentage of the shares owned by the 
board directors. Analystsi,c,t is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm. The second set 
of control variables is about CEO characteristics. Male_CEOi,c,t is one if the CEO of firm i in year t is a 
male, and zero otherwise. Salary_CEOi,c,t is the natural logarithm of the annual salary of the CEO of firm 
i in year t. Age_CEOi,c,t is the age of CEO of firm i in year t. The third set of control variables is about the 
region. GDP_Growthc,t is the GDP growth of city c in year t. Pop_Growthc,t is the population growth rate 
of city c in year t.  
After controlling for the observables that may affect a firm’s perk spending for its normal business 
activities, a positive coefficient β can be viewed as the excess perk spending after a major personnel 
change in the city-level local government. That is, the excess perk spending cannot be attributed to the 
firms’ usual business activities. This is consistent with our hypothesis that after a major personnel change 
in the local government, firms increase their investment in building relations with the government, and 
this extra expense shows up in the annual reports as higher-than-usual spending on travel expenses, 
business entertainment expenses etc.    
[Table 3 About Here] 
The regression results are reported in Table 3. In Column (1), the dependent variable is Perk6_Rev, 
and the coefficient of Induction is 0.057 (with t-statistic 2.80). This is consistent with our hypothesis that 
after the turnover of the Party Secretary or the mayor of a city in China, firms headquartered in that city 
significantly increase their “perk spending”. The economic magnitude of this increase is also significant. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
in a city is promoted from the mayoral position in the same city. In the alternation definition, we define the first year of the Party 
Secretary as the start year form a mayor taking office, rather than from her/his taking office as a secretary. The results are similar.  
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The average revenue is our sample is RMB 5,235 million. Hence, our estimate implies that during the first 
year after a major personnel change in a local city government, an average firm that is headquartered in 
this city has an extra RMB 2.98 million (=5,235×0.057%) perk spending that cannot be attributed to usual 
business activities. Note that the average perk spending in our sample is RMB 16.774 million. That is, 
this excess perk spending is almost 18% of the average perk spending.   
Columns (2)-(5) report regression results based on alternative measures of perk spending: ETC_Rev, 
Perk8_Rev, Ln_Perk6, and Perk6_Asset. For all specifications, the coefficients of Induction are positive 
and significant at the 1% to 10% level, suggesting that perk spending increases after political turnovers. 
We also rerun the regression using a sub-sample without firms in the four major cities of Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing. The results, reported in Column (6), remain similar. The coefficient of 
Induction is 0.068 (with t-statistic 3.12).10  
[Table 4 About Here] 
We then conduct a number of placebo tests. Specifically, we rerun the regression in (1) of Table 3 by 
replacing its dependent variable by Perk6_Revi,c,t+j for j=-2, -1, 1, 2. That is, we now examine if the perk 
spending increases during the two years before a political turnover, or in the first and second years after a 
political turnover. Table 4 reports the regression results. It shows that the coefficient of Induction is 
insignificant for all cases in the placebo tests. Hence, our evidence suggests that only in the first year after 
a new mayor or Party Secretory takes office, do firms headquartered in this city significantly increase 
their perk spending.   
4.2. Instrumental variables  
Our prior evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that firms increase their perk spending to establish 
connections after a political turnover in their local city governments. However, one can imagine that 
omitted variables might affect both political turnovers and perk spending. In this section, we try to 
address this concern using instrumental variables.  
                                                             
10 We also construct a subsample of firms from cities with more than 4 listed firms. Then, we include city-fixed effects and rerun 
the regressions in Table 3. The coefficient of Induction is positive in all specifications, and it is statistically significant in 4 of the 
6 specifications. These results are reported in Table 4 of the Online Appendix.   
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Our instruments are dummy variables which are designed to predict the likelihood for an official to 
leave his current position. The idea is that an official is more likely to leave his current position if he is 
older, or he has been at the current position longer. Specially, we set D_Agec,t to one if the age of the 
mayor (or the Party Secretary) of city c is greater than or equal to the median age when a city mayor (or a 
Party Secretary) leaves his position, and zero otherwise. Similarly, we use “Tenure” to refer to the number 
of years an official has been in office since his latest appointment at the current position. We set 
D_Tenurec,t to one if the tenure of the mayor (or the Party Secretary) of city c is greater than or equal to 
the median tenure when a city mayor (or a Party Secretary) leaves his position, and zero otherwise.    
In Appendix C we show that these two instruments are positively related to the hazard rate for an 
official to leave his current position.11 But it is not obvious why an official’s age and tenure can directly 
affect perk spending for reasons other than building connections.12 Hence, we use both instruments to run 
the following regressions. 
First Stage:    𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1 × 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡                                         (2)  
Second Stage: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃6_𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾2 × 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡               (3)  
where 𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡−1 denotes instrument variable in year t-1, 𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡  is the projected value of 
Inductionc,t obtained from the first-stage regression, and 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 stacks the list of control variables as in the 
regressions in Table 3. The results of the first- and second-stage are reported in Table 5.  
[Table 5 About Here] 
Column (1) shows that the coefficient of D_Agec,t-1 is 0.361 (with t statistic 2.40). Hence, this 
instrument is highly relevant for political turnover, i.e., a city official is more likely to leave his position if 
he is older. Column (2) reports the second-stage results. The coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is 0.087 
(with t statistic 2.23). That is, consistent with our hypothesis, political turnover increases perk spending. 
                                                             
11 In the Online Appendix, we show graphically that the probability of leaving the office is increasing in age (Figure 1) and latest 
tenure (Figure 2) for both Party Secretaries and Mayors. We also show the distribution of age, tenure and latest tenure when Party 
Secretaries and Mayors leave their offices (Figure 3). 
12 One intuitive story is that when an official anticipates that he will soon leave his position, he may try to extract more perks 
before losing his power. However, this story is inconsistent with the evidence in Table 4, which shows that perk spending tends to 
be slightly lower during the couple of years prior to an official leaving office. 
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Columns (3) and (4) report the results based on the instrument D_Tenurec,t-1 and Columns (5) and (6) 
report the results based on both instruments. The results remain similar in both cases.  
4.3. Cross-sectional and time-series variations 
The above results suggest that major personnel changes in a city’s government causes an increase in perk 
spending by firms in that city. However, we acknowledge that our evidence is circumstantial for the 
interpretation that the perk spending increase is due to the investment in building relations with local 
governments. Nevertheless, it is not clear how the local political turnover should increase the perk 
spending through normal economic activities after controlling for local GDP and population growth. If the 
increase in perk spending is merely a response to the change in the local economic environment, this 
change has to be something that is not reflected in the local GDP or population growth.  
To further evaluate our interpretation, we examine the cross-sectional and time-series variations of the 
effect on perk spending. Under our interpretation that the perk spending is used to build relations with 
local governments, we should expect the effect to be stronger when firms’ incentive to build relations is 
stronger or when officials’ incentive to accept perks is stronger. In the following, we examine three types 
of variations.  
[Table 6 About Here] 
First, the variation can result from the differences across the appointed officials. For instance, if the 
newly-appointed official is originally from a different city, it is more likely that fewer firms have existing 
connections with the new official, and hence the incentive to build relations is stronger. To test this, we 
construct a dummy variable, Localc,t, which is 1 if the newly-appointed mayor or Party Secretary of city c 
in year t was working in the city before the appointment, and 0 otherwise. We augment the regression in 
Table 3 by including an interaction term Induction×Local. The results are reported in Column (1) of Table 
6. Consistent with our hypothesis, the interaction coefficient is -0.036 (with t statistic -1.90). Note that the 
coefficient of Induction is 0.072 (with t statistic 2.48). These estimates imply that if the appointee is local, 
its effect on perk spending is weakened by half. Similarly, the effect is expected to be weaker if the new 
official is older perhaps because the connection is less valuable since the new official is not expected to 
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be in power for long, and is less likely to be further promoted. We create a dummy variable Old, which is 
1 if the appointee is older than 59. As shown in Column (2), the coefficient of the interaction term 
Induction×Old is -0.034 (with t statistic -2.27). The coefficient of Induction is 0.069 (with t statistic 2.50). 
Hence, for the old appointees, the effect on perk spending is weakened by almost 80%.  
Second, the variation can result from the differences across firms. For example, if a firm is generally 
more politically connected, the change in the city Party Secretary or mayor is likely to have a smaller 
interruption of its connections with the local government. Hence, its adjustment in perk spending should 
be smaller than less connected firms. We use three variables as proxies for a firm’s political connection. 
The first one is a dummy variable PCi,c,t, which is one if the chairman or CEO of firm i is a former 
government official, i.e., a member of the Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference, or a member of the National Congress of Communist Party of China; and zero otherwise. 
The idea is that if the chairman or CEO of a firm used to be a politician, a change in local politician 
should be a smaller interruption to the firm’s political connection. Hence, its perk spending would 
respond less to the local political turnover. The second variable is SOEi,c,t, which is one if firm i is a 
state-owned enterprise and zero otherwise. The third variable is Big Firmi,c,t, which is one if asset value of 
firm i is larger than the median asset value of the firms in the same industry in year t, and zero otherwise. 
The idea is that state-owned enterprises and larger firms are better connected, and hence political 
turnovers should have a smaller effect on their perk spending. Consistent with our conjecture, Columns 
(3)-(5) show that the interaction coefficients of Induction with the three proxies are all significantly 
negative. Quantitatively, the effect is quite large. For state-owned enterprises, for example, the effect on 
perk spending is reduced by around 80%. 
Finally, the variation can result from the changes in the cost of investing in political connections. For 
example, after the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the unprecedented 
anti-corruption campaign might have made officials more reluctant to accept perks due to the elevated 
risk of being disciplined. Hence, we expected the effect of the personnel changes on perk spending to be 
weakened after the meeting. To test this, we define a dummy variable Post Meetingt, which is one if it is 
after 2012. Column (6) shows that the coefficient of Induction is 0.071 (with t statistic 2.80) and the 
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interaction coefficient of Induction×Post Meeting is -0.045 (with t statistic -2.40). That is, after the 18th 
Nation Congress, the effect of political turnover on perk spending is reduced by around 60%. Similarly, 
after a recent arrest of a local politician in a city, the incoming officials would become more reluctant to 
accept perks. To test this, we manually collected information of arrested city officials, and there are totally 
79 cases of arrested officials in our sample period.13 Then we define a dummy variable Arrestc, t, which is 
one if there was an arrest of a local official in city c in year t-1. Column (7) shows that the coefficient of 
Induction is 0.040 (with t statistic 2.32) and the interaction coefficient of Induction×Arrest is -0.061 (with 
t statistic -1.75). That is, a recent arrest reduces the effect on perk spending. This effect is so strong that 
the total induction effect on perk spending becomes negative.  
These cross-sectional and time-series variations in perk spending lend further support to our 
interpretation that the increase in perk spending is to build up relations with local governments. 
4.4. Robustness checks: Alternative explanations 
In this subsection, we examine several alternative explanations for the main results obtained from the 
above regressions. First, we examine if firms face major changes in their business environment after 
political turnovers. Political leaders often start new strategies, policies, and infrastructure constructions in 
their first year of induction, especially in emerging market (An et al., 2016). This changing business 
environment may increase firms’ costs as they start new projects, and break old ties with business partners. 
Thus, the rise in perk consumption after new government officials taking office may be due to changes in 
the business environment, rather than the purpose of building up relations with local governments. In 
order to test this alternative explanation, we examine whether political turnover affects local firms’ 
investment expenditure and relationship with their main customers and suppliers in Table 7. The 
dependent variable Invest_tai,c,t in Columns (1) is the investment of firm i, measured as the difference 
between cash flow for purchasing and selling fixed assets, divided by total assets at the beginning of the 
year. The dependent variables in Columns (2) and (3), Changeratio_Customeri,c,t and 
Changeratio_Supplieri,c,t are the turnover ratio of top 5 customers and suppliers of listed firm, which are 
respectively the fraction of the firm’s top 5 customers and suppliers that changed in year t. From the first 
                                                             
13 The distribution of arrested officials by province and year is provided in the Online Appendix (Table 2). 
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three columns, we can see that the appointment of new officials does not significantly change local firms’ 
investment or their relationship with their main customers and suppliers.  Hence, we do not find 
evidence of major change in business environment after political turnovers. 
Second, the uncertainty during political turnover may adversely affect firms’ business performance 
(Bo, 1996; Xu et al., 2016). Since our main variable is the ratio of Perk6 to revenue, our findings may 
result from the decline of revenues, rather than the rise of perk spending. To test this alternative 
explanation, we regress firms’ revenues on Induction. As shown in Column (4), local political turnover 
has no significant effect on local firms’ revenues.  
 [Table 7 About Here] 
4.5. Perk spending and firm performance 
Do firms benefit from their perk spending? One hypothesis is that the government may directly provide 
subsidy to firms with stronger relationships with the government. To examine this, we construct 
Subsidy_Revi,t, which is the government subsidy (including fiscal subsidy, tax returns and tax reduction) 
to firm i divided by its sales in year t. If the subsidy is not disclosed, we set Subsidy_Rev to 0. Then, we 
regress it on Perk_Rev and control for the subsidy in the previous year and the set of control variables in 
our main test in Table 3. As shown in Column (1) of Table 8, the coefficient of Perk_Rev is 0.012 (with t 
statistic1.83). This is consistent with our conjecture that firms build their connections to their local 
governments through perk spending, and in return they get more subsidy from their local governments. 
We then include the interaction term Induction×Perk6_Rev in the regression. As shown in Column (2), the 
interaction coefficient is 0.11 (with t statistic1.90) while the coefficient of Perk6_Rev is 0.006 (with t 
statistic1.25), that is, the effect of perk spending on subsidy occurs mostly during political turnovers.  
[Table 8 About Here] 
A second hypothesis is that connections with the local government officials may help a firm obtain 
bank loans, especially long-term loans. To test this, we construct Leveragei,c,t, the ratio of firm i’s total 
liabilities in year t to its lagged total assets in year t-1; and LongTermi,c,t, firm i’s long-term loan divided 
by its lagged total liabilities in year t-1. We then run similar regressions. As shown in Columns (3) 
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through (6) of Table 8, perk spending is positively associated with higher debt ratio, especially the 
long-term debt ratio, and this association is stronger during political turnovers.   
[Table 9 About Here] 
The above evidence suggests that firms with higher perk spending receive more future government 
subsidy and have better access to bank finance. A natural question is whether they also have better future 
performances. To examine this, we regress future firm performance measures such as ROAi,c,t+1 and 
ROEi,c,t+1 on Perk6_Revi,c,t. We include the same set of control variables and year-, industry-, and 
province-fixed effects as in our earlier regressions. The results are reported in Table 9. As shown in 
Columns (1) and (2), the coefficient of Perk6_Revi,c,t is insignificant. In Columns (3) and (4), we include 
the interaction term Induction×Perk6_Rev in our regressions. In both cases, the interaction coefficients 
are still insignificant.  
That is, we do not have evidence that firms with higher perk spending have better future 
performance. This result may be somewhat surprising. From Table 8, we do find that firms’ perk spending 
leads to more government subsidies and better financing, but from Table 9 they are not reflected in better 
future performance of the firms as measured by the ROA or ROE, once we control for their lagged values. 
One possible explanation is that firms’ perk expenses are mostly a “rat race”, that is, all firms have to 
invest in relationship building with the local government just to avoid falling behind other firms, but they 
do not get ahead of other firms.14 Another possibility is that more government subsidies and better 
financing from the local government are tunneled to become private benefits of firms’ managers. 
5. Political turnover and firm management turnover 
Our results so far suggest that perk spending is one way for firms to build connections with politicians. In 
this section, we examine another type of government relationship building: top manager turnovers. In 
China, the government retains the ultimate decision right on the appointment of SOEs’ CEOs and 
                                                             
14 This is reminiscent to the finding in Kang (2016) that lobbying in the US has a statistically significant but small effect on the 
probability of a policy being legislated into law (only 0.05 percentage points), partly because the effects of lobbying expenditures 
by supporting and opposing lobbies partially cancel each other out. 
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chairmen (Fan et al., 2007). The appointments of CEOs and Chairmen are carried out by the Organization 
Department of the CCP at the level corresponding to the government which owns the SOEs. Many of 
these senior managers in SOEs are typically quasi-government officials rather than professional managers. 
Their promotion and demotions are likely to be less associated with operating performance and more 
related to political considerations such as loyalty in carrying out policy mandates and connections with 
powerful politicians. Thus, their career paths often overlap with local or central government officials 
(Wong, 2014). Hence, we hypothesize that local political turnovers will lead to the changes of Chairmen 
or CEOs for local SOEs in that city.  
To test this hypothesis, we construct a dummy variable, Turnover_Chairmani,c,t, which is 1 when the 
chairman of firm i in city c leaves office in year t, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define a dummy 
variable Turnover_CEOi,c,t for CEO turnovers. Then we regress these two dummy variables in year t+1 
on Inductionc,t. We control for Firmsize, Leverage, ROA, as well as the characteristics of top managers, 
including Tenure and Age in the regressions. As the impact of managers’ tenure and age on their turnover 
may be non-linear, we also add their square terms in the regressions. We also include a control variable 
STi,c,t, which is 1 if firm i is a “ST or PT firm”, and 0 otherwise.15  
[Table 10 About Here] 
The results are shown in Table 10. Panel A reports the results for turnovers for CEOs. The 
regressions in Columns (1)-(3) are for the samples of non-SOEs, SOEs owned by the central government, 
and SOEs owned by provincial governments, respectively. For these three samples, the coefficient of 
Induction is insignificant. In contrast, for the sample of SOEs owned by city governments, the coefficient 
of Induction is 0.388 (t=3.11), suggesting that a change in leadership of a city government increases the 
probability of CEO changes in the firms headquartered in that city. The results for chairman turnovers, 
reported in Panel B, are similar. The coefficient of Induction is only significant for city-SOE samples.  
                                                             
15 In 1998, the China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced the ST and PT designation policy to the Chinese stock 
market. Under the CSRC’s guideline, a firm can become an ST (PT) firm if it experiences a net loss for two (three) consecutive 
years. Such firms will receive stricter scrutiny from regulators, including a narrower daily price fluctuation range (5% versus 10% 
for normal stocks) and mandatory audited semi-annual financial reports. When a firm is denoted as a ST or PT firm, their 
managers are more likely to be changed.  
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One interpretation of the above results is that newly appointed city officials replace Chairmen and 
CEOs of local SOEs by their “friends.” This interpretation implies that during the tenure of an official, the 
chairmen and CEOs, who are “friends” of the official, are less likely to be replaced. Since the friend 
network is not observable, we test this prediction indirectly. Specifically, we construct a dummy variable 
Friendi,c,t for CEO or chairman i in year t as follows. The dummy variable is set to be 1 if the city official 
who “appointed” CEO i (or chairman i) is still in office in year t. That is, if manager i is appointed when 
official j is in office, we view i as a friend of j. The hypothesis is that if j is still in office, i is less likely to 
be replaced.  
To test this hypothesis, we regress Turnover_CEOi,c,t+1 on Friendi,c,t. The results are reported in Panel 
A of Table 11. Consistent with our hypothesis, it shows that if a CEO of a city-SOE is a friend of city 
officials, he is less likely to be removed during the tenure of those officials. In contrast, this result does 
not hold for non-SOEs and SOEs owned by central and provincial government. The results on the 
turnovers of Chairmen, reported in Panel B, are similar. The coefficient of Friend is insignificant for 
non-SOE and is only significant for city-SOE and provincial-SOE samples. 
[Table 11 About Here] 
In summary, these results are consistent with the interpretation that, after political turnovers, the 
connections between local governments and SOEs are established partly through appointing Chairmen 
and CEOs with connections to the newly-appointed government officials.  
6. Conclusion   
In this paper we empirically study how firms build their relationship with local government officials 
in China. We focus on two mechanisms: perk spending and personnel changes. We find that, following 
the turnover of the Party Secretary or mayor of a city in China, firms (especially private firms) 
headquartered in that city significantly increase their “perk spending” (e.g., travel expenses, business 
entertainment expenses, overseas training expenses, board meeting expenses, company car expenses, and 
meeting expenses). Using the age and tenure of incumbents as instruments, our evidence supports the 
interpretation that the perk spending increase is due to local political turnover. Moreover, we also find that 
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the perk expenses increase more when the demand to build relation is stronger, e.g., when the incoming 
official is young, or is from a different city, and when the firm is less connected. This effect is weaker 
when officials are more reluctant to accept perks due to elevated risks of discipline, for example, after the 
18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, or after an arrest of local politicians for 
corruption cases. Our evidence also shows that firms with more perk expenses receive more future 
benefits such as government subsidy and access to financing, but do not have better future performance as 
measured by returns on assets or equity.  
Interestingly, the second relation building mechanism, personnel change, is only effective among 
local SOEs. Local political turnover tends to be followed by changes of Chairmen or CEOs of 
state-owned enterprises located in that city, particularly for those controlled by the local government. In 
contrast, private firms and SOEs that are controlled by the central government do not seem to engage in 
personnel changes following the turnover in the local government leadership. We also find that those 
Chairmen or CEOs of local SOEs are the protégés of the local government officials: they are less likely to 
be replaced in the future as long as their “mentors” remain in offices. 
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Appendix A: Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions Source 
Dependent Variables   
Perk6 The amount of six expense categories related to perk consumption in millions of RMB. 
The Perk6 includes: traveling expenses, business entertainment expenses, overseas 
training expenses, board meeting expenses, company car expenses, and meeting 
expenses. 
Manual collection 
Perk6_Rev The ratio of Perk6 to revenue * 100. Manual collection 
ETC_Rev The ratio of ETC to revenue * 100. The ETC includes: traveling expenses, business 
entertainment expenses, company car expenses. 
Manual collection 
Perk8_Rev The ratio of Perk8 to revenue * 100. The Perk8 includes administrative expenses and 
communication expenses besides of those in Perk6. 
Manual collection 
Ln_Perk6 The natural log value of Perks6 related to perk consumption Manual collection 
Perk6_Asset The ratio of Perks6 to lagged assets * 100. Manual collection 
Political Turnover Variables   
Induction A dummy variable that equals 1 when a local government official (mayor or secretary) 
in the firm’s location takes office and 0 otherwise.  
Manual collection 
Post Meeting A dummy variable that is one if it is after 2012, and zero otherwise.  Manual collection 
Arrest A dummy variable that is one if there was at least one arrest of city government 
officials in the previous year and zero otherwise. 
Manual collection 
Financial Variables 
Invest_ta The investment of listed firm, measured as the difference between cash flow for 
purchasing fixed assets and selling fixed assets, divided by total assets at the beginning 
of the year. 
CSMAR 
Changeratio_Customer Turnover ratio of top 5 customers for listed firm, equals the changed number of top 5 
customers divided by 5. 
CSMAR 
Changeratio_Supplier Turnover ratio of top 5 suppliers for listed firm, equals the changed number of top 5 
suppliers divided by 5. 
CSMAR 
Log(Revenue) Natural logarithm of annual revenue. CSMAR 
Performance and Channel Variables 
Subsidy_Rev The government subsidy divided by revenues. If the Subsidy is not disclosed, then we 
set Subsidy equals 0. 
Manual collection 
LongTerm Long-term loan divided by lagged liabilities. CSMAR 
Top managers' Turnover Variables 
Turnover_Chairman  A dummy variable that equals one when Chairman leaves office and zero otherwise. Manual collection 
Turnover_CEO  A dummy variable that equals one when CEO leaves office and zero otherwise. Manual collection 
Friend A dummy variable, which is one if the mayor or party secretary who “appointed” the 
CEO or chairman is still in office, and zero otherwise.  
Manual collection 
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Instrumental variables 
D_Age A dummy variable, which is one if the age of the mayor (or the party secretary) of city 
c is greater than or equal to the median age when a city mayor (or party secretary) 
leaves his position, and zero otherwise.  
Manual collection 
D_Tenure A dummy variable, which is one if the tenure of the mayor (or the party secretary) of 
city c is greater than or equal to the median tenure when a city mayor (or party 
secretary) leaves his position, and zero otherwise.   
Manual collection 
Other Variables 
FirmSize The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. CSMAR 
Leverage The ratio of a firm’s total liabilities to lagged total assets. CSMAR 
ROA The ratio of a firm’s net income and total assets. CSMAR 
ROE The ratio of a firm’s net income and equity value. CSMAR 
Dual A dummy variable, which is one if the board Chairman is also the CEO, and zero 
otherwise. 
CSMAR 
InDir Independence of the board, measured as the ratio of the number of independent 
directors over the total number of directors on the board. 
CSMAR 
SOE An indicator variable that equals one if the firm is state-controlled and zero otherwise. CSMAR 
Insholdper Institutional ownership. CSMAR 
DirHolding Directors' shareholding percentage on the board. CSMAR 
Analysts Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm plus 1. CSMAR 
Male_Topmanager An indicator variable that equals to one if the top manager (CEO or Chairman) is male 
and zero otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Salary_Topmanager Natural logarithm of annual salary of the top manager (CEO or Chairman) plus 1. CSMAR 
Age_Topmanager Age of the top manager (CEO or Chairman). CSMAR 
GDP_Growth City-level GDP growth for the city in which the firm is located. CEI 
Pop_Growth Population growth rate of the city in which the firm is located. CEI 
PC Political connection of the executives, PC takes one if the CEO or Chairman is a 
former government official, a former military officer, a member of the Committee of 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, or a member of the National 
Congress; zero otherwise. 
CSMAR 
Post Anticorruption regulation, which equals one if the sample period is after the eight-point 
regulation that was adopted in November 2012 and zero otherwise. 
The Website of 
Commission for 
Discipline 
Inspection of 
CPC 
Age_Official The natural logarithm of city officials' age. Manual 
collection 
Tenure The period of time when top managers hold the position. CSMAR 
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Appendix B: Types of Induction 
This table presents the distribution of political turnovers over the sample period 2003–2014. The row Mayor (or Secretary) reports the number of cases 
where a city mayor (or Party Secretary) is replaced. The row Mayor and Secretary (Mayor or secretary) reports the number of cases where both a city 
mayor and Party Secretary are (either a city mayor or Party Secretary is) replaced.  
 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Mayor （N） 57 30 28 39 51 54 20 26 71 90 82 33 581 
  （%） 52.29% 23.08% 20.14% 26.90% 36.96% 37.76% 13.25% 11.98% 32.13% 40.54% 37.44% 15.00% 28.29% 
Secretary （N） 44 21 31 34 40 58 19 27 62 73 87 28 524 
  （%） 40.37% 16.15% 22.30% 23.45% 28.99% 40.56% 12.58% 12.44% 28.05% 32.88% 39.73% 12.73% 25.51% 
Mayor and Secretary （N） 34 11 15 20 23 37 11 11 35 44 52 14 307 
  （%） 31.19% 8.46% 10.79% 13.79% 16.67% 25.87% 7.28% 5.07% 15.84% 19.82% 23.74% 6.36% 14.95% 
Mayor or Secretary （N） 67 40 44 53 68 75 28 42 98 119 117 47 798 
  （%） 61.47% 30.77% 31.65% 36.55% 49.28% 52.45% 18.54% 19.35% 44.34% 53.60% 53.42% 21.36% 38.85% 
Total （N） 109 130 139 145 138 143 151 217 221 222 219 220 2054 
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Appendix C: Survival analysis of officials’ leaving office 
In panel A, we first plot the hazard rate using the Kaplan-Meier method, a nonparametric approach 
that estimates a survival function without covariates and computes the hazard rate (1-conditional 
survival probability). In Panel B, we examine whether age and latest tenure of officials will impact 
conditional probability of officials’ leaving office by taking into account other city level feature that 
could potentially affect the probability at a given time, such as GDP_growth and Pop_growth. The 
dependent variable is the hazard ratio for Cox proportional hazard regression. 
 
Panel A: Departure curves using the Kaplan-Meier method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Departure curves of local officials 
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Panel B: Cox proportional hazard model 
Dep. Var.= 
Replace_Mayorc,t Replace_Secretaryc,t 
(1) (2) 
Age_Mayorc,t 0.038***  
  (3.35)  
Tenure_Latest_Mayorc,t 0.561***  
  (16.9)  
Age_Secretaryc,t  0.040*** 
   (2.96) 
Tenure_Latest_Secretaryc,t  0.526*** 
   (14.9) 
GDP_growthc,t 1.998*** 2.555*** 
  (3.06) (3.33) 
Pop_growthc,t -0.013 -0.036*** 
  (-1.14) (-2.86) 
Fixed effect YP YP 
Observations 1867 1702 
Prob > chi2 0.0513 0.0494 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of main variables in the sample period from 2003 to 
2014. All variables are as defined in the Appendix A. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean STD 10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
Perk6_Rev (%) 7935 0.736  1.122  0.103  0.202  0.399  0.803  1.515  
ETC_Rev (%) 7935 0.669  0.986  0.091  0.188  0.375  0.746  1.387  
Perk8_Rev (%) 6316 1.043  1.295  0.179  0.347  0.658  1.216  2.169  
Perk6(Million RMB) 7935 16.774  64.198  1.352  3.010  6.400  14.175  31.448  
Perk6_Asset (%) 7935 0.380  0.450  0.061  0.118  0.240  0.461  0.806  
Induction 7935 0.370  0.483  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  
Same City 7935 0.510  0.500  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Soe 7935 0.523  0.499  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
PC 7935 0.174  0.379  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  
Invest_ta 7715 0.061  0.061  0.004  0.018  0.045  0.087  0.145  
Changeratio_Customer 7174 0.461  0.399  0.000  0.000  0.400  0.800  1.000  
Changeratio_Supplier 3973 0.437  0.406  0.000  0.000  0.400  0.800  1.000  
Log(Revenue) 7935 21.277  1.308  19.711  20.413  21.176  22.083  23.006  
Ros 5716 0.134  1.887  0.031  0.080  0.140  0.240  0.352  
Growth1_Earning 5716 -0.279  1.158  -1.702  -0.533  -0.302  1.289  1.989  
Growth3_Earning 3572 0.402  1.981  -2.384  -0.505  0.209  1.123  2.722  
Subsidy_Rev 5716 0.588  0.823  0.000  0.024  0.216  0.602  1.276  
Lev 5716 0.474  0.198  0.188  0.318  0.474  0.614  0.731  
Lloan_Debt 5716 0.103  0.147  0.000  0.000  0.023  0.148  0.318  
Hold_Finan 5716 0.116  0.141  0.000  0.000  0.110  0.164  0.271  
FirmSize 7935 21.882  1.108  20.584  21.085  21.751  22.544  23.413  
Leverage 7935 0.464  0.198  0.188  0.316  0.474  0.615  0.729  
ROA 7935 0.040  0.052  0.002  0.013  0.034  0.064  0.103  
Dual 7935 0.188  0.391  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  
InDir 7935 0.364  0.049  0.333  0.333  0.333  0.385  0.429  
InsHoldper 7935 0.176  0.186  0.007  0.031  0.107  0.266  0.467  
DirHolding 7935 8.495  7.324  0.000  0.000  9.998  15.127  18.252  
Analysts 7935 2.190  1.794  0.000  0.000  2.398  3.761  4.533  
Male_CEO 7935 0.941  0.235  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
Salary_CEO 7935 12.901  0.858  11.812  12.429  12.953  13.430  13.862  
Age_CEO 7935 48.087  6.375  40.000  44.000  48.000  52.000  56.000  
GDP_Growth 7935 0.132  0.054  0.072  0.091  0.113  0.169  0.214  
Pop_Growth 7935 0.009  0.018  0.001  0.003  0.005  0.009  0.022  
Relation 5626  0.691 0.466  0.000  0.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  
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Table 2: The correlation coefficients of the main variables 
This table presents the correlation coefficients of the main variables. The upper-fight part 
(bottom-left part) presents the Spearman (Pearson) correlation matrix. All variables are defined in 
the Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variable Perk6_Rev ETC_Rev Perk8_Rev Ln_Perk6 Perk6_Asset Induction 
Perk6_Rev 1.000  0.977*** 0.810*** 0.310*** 0.762*** 0.045*** 
ETC_Rev 0.973*** 1.000  0.796*** 0.297*** 0.750*** 0.049*** 
Perk8_Rev 0.815*** 0.810*** 1.000  0.071*** 0.530*** 0.020* 
Ln_Perk6 0.235*** 0.225*** 0.027** 1.000  0.492*** 0.036*** 
Perk6_Asset 0.697*** 0.670*** 0.509*** 0.430*** 1.000  0.074*** 
Induction 0.024** 0.029** 0.015* 0.039*** 0.039*** 1.000  
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Table 3: The impact of political turnover on perks 
This table presents the regression results of the impact of political turnover on perk spending. The dependent 
variables are Perk6_Revi,c,, ETC_Revi,c,t, Perk8_Revi,c,t, Ln_Perk6i,c,t, and Perk6_Asseti,c,t in Columns (1) through (5), 
respectively. In Column (6), the dependent variables are Perk6_Revi,c, and the sample does not include observations 
on “major 4” cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). The independent variables Inductionc,t is the 
political turnover. Year-, industry-, and provincial-fixed effects (IYP) are included in all regressions. All variables 
are as defined in the Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by 
city. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Dep. Var.= Perk6_Revi,c,t ETC_Revi,c,t Perk8_Revi,c,t Ln_Perk6i,c,t Perk6_Asseti,c,t 
W.O. major 4 
cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inductionc,t 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.118*** 0.013* 0.068*** 
  (2.80) (2.90) (2.80) (3.09) (1.83) (3.12) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.202*** -0.183*** -0.282*** 0.557*** -0.133*** -0.221*** 
  (-7.23) (-7.25) (-7.85) (15.2) (-14.1) (-6.62) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.374** -0.304** -0.617*** 0.585*** 0.260*** -0.307* 
  (-2.20) (-2.10) (-3.66) (4.70) (5.10) (-1.71) 
ROAi,c,t -2.693*** -2.348*** -2.360*** 0.451 0.525*** -2.804*** 
  (-6.49) (-6.56) (-4.40) (0.91) (3.87) (-5.84) 
Duali,c,t 0.014 0.020 -0.026 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.22) (0.34) (-0.45) (-0.10) (-0.15) (-0.018) 
Indiri,c,t 0.781** 0.510** 0.651 0.326 0.171 0.591* 
  (2.39) (2.03) (1.44) (0.69) (1.53) (1.78) 
SOEi,c,t -0.243*** -0.187*** -0.290*** 0.086 -0.029 -0.193*** 
  (-3.93) (-3.40) (-4.13) (1.46) (-1.37) (-3.25) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.402*** 0.370*** 0.324*** -0.054 0.064* 0.430*** 
  (4.36) (4.38) (2.64) (-0.53) (1.80) (3.59) 
DirHoldingi,c,t -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009** 0.001 -0.001 -0.006* 
  (-2.79) (-2.60) (-2.38) (0.28) (-0.53) (-1.72) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.011 0.013 -0.008 0.043*** 0.015*** 0.004 
  (0.80) (1.03) (-0.50) (2.76) (2.61) (0.24) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.162** 0.145** 0.082 0.266*** 0.097*** 0.163** 
  (2.27) (2.58) (0.72) (2.77) (4.38) (2.17) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.136*** 0.105*** 0.061* 0.205*** 0.075*** 0.112*** 
  (3.94) (3.54) (1.73) (6.10) (5.63) (3.12) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.008*** 
  (-2.95) (-2.99) (-2.27) (-0.77) (-2.94) (-2.60) 
GDP_Growthc,t 0.452 0.617 0.622 0.309 0.220 0.505 
  (0.54) (0.87) (0.81) (0.35) (0.70) (0.50) 
Pop_Growthc,t -0.272 -0.243 1.693** 0.005 -0.069 -0.997 
  (-0.41) (-0.38) (2.30) (0.76) (-0.21) (-1.00) 
Constant 5.135*** 4.796*** 8.772*** 2.128*** 2.642*** 4.865*** 
  (6.61) (6.90) (9.60) (6.23) (10.1) (5.09) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 7935 7935 6316 7935 7935 6631 
Adj. R2 0.224 0.217 0.232 0.316 0.325 0.229 
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Table 4: Placebo tests 
This table reports the results of placebo tests. Specifically, we rerun the regression in Column (1) of Table 3 by 
replacing the dependent variable by Perk6_Revi,c,t+j for 𝑗 = −2,−1,1,2. All variables are as defined in the Appendix A. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
Perk6_Revi,c,t+j 
𝑗 = −2 𝑗 = −1 𝑗 = 1 𝑗 = 2 
(3) (1) (2) (4) 
Inductionc,t -0.005 -0.003 -0.019 -0.001 
  (-0.48) (-0.30) (-1.64) (-0.12) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.122*** -0.128*** -0.132*** -0.135*** 
  (-9.93) (-11.6) (-11.2) (-9.88) 
Leveragei,c,t 0.185*** 0.249*** 0.258*** 0.262*** 
  (3.04) (4.43) (4.28) (3.53) 
ROAi,c,t 0.477*** 0.521*** 0.469*** 0.582*** 
  (2.75) (3.30) (2.62) (2.75) 
Duali,c,t -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 0.012 
  (-0.043) (-0.30) (-0.043) (0.32) 
Indiri,c,t 0.174 0.231* 0.247* 0.342* 
  (1.08) (1.70) (1.67) (1.95) 
SOEi,c,t -0.029 -0.026 -0.028 -0.017 
  (-1.29) (-1.22) (-1.12) (-0.64) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.047 0.070* 0.059 0.065 
  (1.12) (1.81) (1.36) (1.29) 
DirHoldingi,c,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.23) (-0.27) (-0.58) (-0.43) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.016** 0.018** 
  (2.92) (2.86) (2.43) (2.06) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.105*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 0.093*** 
  (4.34) (4.13) (3.88) (3.23) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 
  (5.49) (5.55) (5.18) (4.92) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
  (-3.01) (-3.09) (-3.20) (-3.11) 
GDP_Growthc,t -0.520 -0.160 0.260 0.062 
  (-1.37) (-0.51) (0.76) (0.16) 
Pop_Growthc.t 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
  (0.028) (0.14) (-0.18) (-0.34) 
Constant 2.369*** 2.492*** 2.059*** 2.035*** 
  (6.67) (7.62) (5.60) (4.76) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 4432 6126 5862 4191 
Adj. R2 0.366 0.344 0.329 0.336 
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Table 5: Two-stage IV specification 
This table presents the results of the following two-stage regressions. 
 
First Stage:    𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 × 𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡−1 + 𝛾1 × 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡                                           
Second Stage: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃6_𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2 × 𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡 + 𝛾2 × 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡                 
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐶,𝑡−1 denotes the instrumental variable in the first stage. One instrumental variable is D_Agec,t, which is 
one if the age of the mayor (or the party secretary) of city c is greater than or equal to the median age when a city 
mayor (or party secretary) leaves his position, and zero otherwise. The other instrument is D_Tenurec,t. “Tenure” 
refers to the number of years an official has been in office since his appointment, or last reappointment, at the 
current position. D_Tenurec,t is one if the tenure of the mayor (or the party secretary) of city c is greater than or 
equal to the median tenure when a city mayor (or party secretary) leaves his position, and zero otherwise. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐,𝑡 is the projected value of Inductionc,t obtained from the first-stage regression. 𝑀𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 includes the 
list of control variables as in Table 3. We further control for year, industry, and provincial fixed effects and cluster 
the standard errors at the city level in all regressions. All variables are as defined in the Appendix A. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Stage 1 Stage 2   Stage 1 Stage 2   Stage 1 Stage 2 
Inductionc,t Perk6_Revi.c,t   Inductionc,t Perk6_Revi.c,t   Inductionc,t Perk6_Revi.c,t 
(1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
D_Agec,t  0.361**           0.178*   
 
 (2.40)           (1.79)   
D_Tenurec,t        0.363***     0.345***   
        (4.08)     (4.13)   
Exp_Inductionc.t   0.087**     0.136*     0.132** 
    (2.23)     (1.84)     (2.10) 
                  
FirmSizei,c,t 0.036 -0.173***   0.038* -0.174***   0.040* -0.173*** 
  (1.52) (-10.7)   (1.72) (-10.7)   (1.75) (-10.7) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.271** -0.471***   -0.286*** -0.461***   -0.289*** -0.461*** 
  (-2.49) (-4.86)   (-2.62) (-4.86)   (-2.66) (-4.85) 
ROAi,c,t 0.423 -2.865***   0.387 -2.888***   0.409 -2.911*** 
  (1.07) (-6.70)   (1.01) (-6.82)   (1.04) (-6.91) 
Duali,c,t -0.061 -0.088**   -0.066 -0.087**   -0.074 -0.085** 
  (-1.42) (-2.53)   (-1.42) (-2.52)   (-1.51) (-2.47) 
Indiri,c,t 0.738** 0.758***   0.795** 0.723***   0.774** 0.708*** 
  (2.11) (2.86)   (2.16) (2.88)   (2.12) (2.83) 
SOEi,c,t 0.083** -0.220***   0.077* -0.226***   0.075* -0.224*** 
  (2.11) (-6.42)   (1.85) (-6.68)   (1.85) (-6.66) 
Insholdperi,c,t -0.046 0.328***   -0.057 0.331***   -0.058 0.330*** 
  (-0.41) (4.65)   (-0.53) (4.70)   (-0.54) (4.69) 
DirHoldingi,c,t 0.002 -0.009***   0.004 -0.009***   0.004 -0.009*** 
  (0.91) (-4.04)   (1.55) (-4.11)   (1.46) (-4.07) 
Analystsi,c,t -0.028** 0.024***   -0.030** 0.024***   -0.031** 0.024*** 
  (-1.98) (2.77)   (-2.04) (2.79)   (-2.10) (2.79) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.013 0.148***   0.021 0.148***   0.024 0.145*** 
  (0.20) (2.90)   (0.28) (2.89)   (0.33) (2.86) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t -0.000 0.084***   -0.002 0.088***   0.001 0.086*** 
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  (-0.018) (4.08)   (-0.071) (4.25)   (0.029) (4.21) 
GDP_Growthc,t -0.652 -0.039   -0.594 -0.009   -0.628 -0.019 
  (-0.56) (-0.16)   (-0.45) (-0.038)   (-0.46) (-0.080) 
Pop_Growthc.t -0.077*** 0.001   -0.066** 0.002   -0.065** 0.003 
  (-2.80) (0.27)   (-2.45) (0.93)   (-2.46) (0.98) 
Constant -0.453 3.673***   0.267 3.614***   0.390 3.624*** 
  (-0.93) (8.56)   (0.53) (8.62)   (0.75) (8.65) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP   IYP IYP   IYP IYP 
N 5374 5374   5374 5374   5374 5374 
Adj. R2 0.114 0.191   0.206 0.196   0.207 0.196 
Weak IV F  191.332***   219.021***   252.10*** 
Hansen J statistic              0.362 
Chi-sq(1) P-val             0.5477 
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Table 6: The incentives to build up political connections 
This table reports the results from regressions that extend the regression (1) in Table 3 by including an interaction 
term Inductionc,t×Di,c,t, where Di,c,t is a dummy variable. In Column (1), Di,c,t is one if the newly-appointed official 
is from city c, and zero otherwise. In column (2), Di,c,t is one if the newly-appointed official is older than 59, and 
zero otherwise. In Column (3), Di,c,t is one if the CEO or chairman of firm i is a former government official, a 
member of the Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, or a member of the National 
Congress of Communist Party of China, and zero otherwise. In Column (4), Di,c,t is one if firm i is a state-owned 
enterprise, and zero otherwise. In Column (5), Di,c,t is one if firm i’s total assets is larger than the median of asset 
value of firms in the same industry in year t, and zero otherwise. In Column (6), Di,c,t is one if t is after 2012, and 
zero otherwise. In Column (7), Di,c,t is one if there was an arrest of government official in city c in year t-1, and zero 
otherwise. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year-, industry-, and provincial-fixed effects are included 
in all regressions. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by city. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. 
Var=Perk6_Revi,c,t 
Official Origins 
is same city 
Official 
age >=59 PC SOE Big firm  
Post 
Meeting Arrest 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Inductionc,t 0.072** 0.070** 0.069*** 0.098*** 0.135** 0.071*** 0.040** 
  (2.48) (2.50) (3.50) (2.80) (2.54) (2.80) (2.32) 
Inductionc,t×Di,c,t -0.036* -0.034** -0.016* -0.081** -0.060* -0.045** -0.061* 
  (-1.90) (-2.27) (-1.74) (-1.98) (-1.79) (-2.40) (-1.75) 
Di,c,t -0.004 -0.069 -0.025 -0.157*** -0.014   0.083 
  (-0.90) (-0.89) (-0.60) (-2.73) (-0.15)   (1.31) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.183*** -0.185*** -0.164*** -0.184*** -0.182*** -0.183*** -0.159*** 
  (-7.26) (-6.00) (-6.89) (-7.25) (-4.61) (-7.26) (-5.17) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.304** -0.413** -0.339*** -0.302** -0.414** -0.304** -0.347** 
  (-2.10) (-2.29) (-2.73) (-2.09) (-2.26) (-2.10) (-2.06) 
ROAi,c,t -2.346*** -2.855*** -2.131*** -2.351*** -2.857*** -2.349*** -2.128*** 
  (-6.54) (-6.36) (-5.55) (-6.57) (-6.32) (-6.55) (-4.50) 
Duali,c,t 0.019 -0.063 0.017 0.020 -0.064 0.020 0.008 
  (0.33) (-1.13) (0.35) (0.34) (-1.15) (0.34) (0.15) 
Indiri,c,t 0.508** 0.674* 0.392 0.510** 0.669* 0.510** 0.647 
  (2.02) (1.80) (1.45) (2.04) (1.81) (2.03) (1.43) 
SOEi,c,t -0.187*** -0.230*** -0.164*** 0.000 -0.230*** -0.187*** -0.151** 
  (-3.40) (-3.07) (-3.45) (0.00) (-3.07) (-3.40) (-2.19) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.368*** 0.316*** 0.320*** 0.370*** 0.316*** 0.370*** 0.398*** 
  (4.39) (3.44) (4.18) (4.38) (3.45) (4.38) (4.16) 
DirHoldingi,c,t -0.008*** -0.007* -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007* -0.008*** -0.004 
  (-2.61) (-1.82) (-3.17) (-2.61) (-1.85) (-2.60) (-1.05) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.013 0.027* 0.012 0.013 0.027* 0.013 0.013 
  (1.04) (1.78) (0.95) (1.04) (1.77) (1.03) (0.54) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.144** 0.122 0.120** 0.146** 0.123 0.145** 0.144** 
  (2.56) (1.41) (2.32) (2.60) (1.39) (2.57) (2.29) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.091*** 0.105*** 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.114*** 
  (3.54) (3.17) (3.18) (3.56) (3.18) (3.54) (2.97) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.007*** -0.004 -0.006** -0.007*** -0.004 -0.007*** -0.005** 
  (-2.98) (-1.66) (-2.47) (-2.98) (-1.65) (-2.99) (-2.03) 
GDP_Growthc,t 0.633 -0.193 -0.023 0.606 -0.181 0.603 -0.168 
  (0.90) (-0.53) (-0.03) (0.86) (-0.49) (0.85) (-0.49) 
Pop_Growthc,t -0.251 0.002 -0.260 -0.253 0.002 -0.236 0.002 
  (-0.39) (0.32) (-0.43) (-0.40) (0.29) (-0.37) (0.39) 
Constant 4.798*** 4.699*** 4.110*** 4.787*** 4.016*** 4.793*** 3.573*** 
  (6.91) (7.46) (7.16) (6.91) (5.64) (6.90) (5.64) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 7935 7935 7233 7935 7935 7935 7935 
Adj. R2 0.217 0.227 0.203 0.217 0.227 0.217 0.240 
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Table 7: Alternative explanations: The effects of political turnover on firms' operations 
This table presents the results of the impact of political turnover on firms' other financial variables. The dependent 
variable in Columns (1), Invest_tai,c,t, is the investment expenditure, measured as the difference between cash flow 
for purchasing and selling fixed assets, divided by total assets at the beginning of the year. The dependent variables 
in Columns (2) and (3), Changeratio_Customeri,c,t and Changeratio_Supplieri,c,t, are turnover ratio of firm i’s top 5 
customers and suppliers, respectively. Log(Revenue) i,c,t in Columns (4) is the natural logarithm of revenue. The 
independent variables are the same as those in Table 3. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
standard errors clustered by city. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
Invest_tai,c,t 
Changeratio 
_Customeri,c,t 
Changeratio 
_Supplieri,c,t 
Log(Revenue) i,c,t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inductionc,t -0.001 0.018 0.032 0.003 
  (-0.47) (1.50) (1.27) (0.15) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.003** -0.008 -0.006 0.894*** 
  (-2.44) (-0.69) (-0.36) (44.4) 
Leveragei,c,t 0.004 0.067 0.062 0.896*** 
  (0.63) (1.29) (0.74) (7.41) 
Roai,c,t 0.061*** -0.095 -0.123 2.573*** 
  (2.83) (-0.66) (-0.63) (9.01) 
Duali,c,t 0.007** -0.021 0.001 -0.061** 
  (2.25) (-0.95) (0.035) (-2.15) 
Indiri,c,t -0.003 -0.040 0.396** -0.320 
  (-0.18) (-0.23) (2.07) (-1.41) 
SOEi,c,t -0.005** 0.026 0.017 0.135*** 
  (-2.22) (1.21) (0.70) (3.66) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.009 0.073 0.028 -0.185** 
  (1.54) (1.34) (0.53) (-2.10) 
DirHoldingi,c,t 0.000** 0.000 0.001 0.002 
  (2.01) (0.30) (0.35) (0.77) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.008*** -0.015*** -0.019*** 0.032*** 
  (12.1) (-3.02) (-2.98) (3.47) 
Analystsi,c,t -0.004 0.121*** 0.037 0.070 
  (-0.93) (3.15) (0.92) (1.36) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t -0.001 -0.012 -0.028 0.096*** 
  (-0.92) (-1.04) (-1.60) (5.64) 
Age_CEOi,c,t 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.60) (0.90) (1.64) (0.82) 
Gdp_Growthc,t -0.006 0.056 0.131 0.117 
  (-0.42) (0.63) (1.00) (0.60) 
Pop_Growthc,t 0.000 0.004* -0.003 -0.000 
  (0.70) (1.75) (-1.31) (-0.12) 
Constant 0.135*** 0.702*** -0.306 -0.659 
  (4.55) (2.86) (-0.91) (-1.49) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 7715 7174 3973 7935 
Adj. R2 0.199 0.060 0.100 0.798 
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Table 8: Benefits from perk spending  
This table presents the regression results on the effects of perk spending on government subsidy and access to 
financing. Subsidy_Revi,c,t+1 is the ratio of firm i’s government subsidy to revenue in year t+1, where the 
government subsidy includes fiscal subsidy, tax returns and tax reduction. Leveragei,c,t+1 is the ratio of firm i’s total 
liability to total asset in year t+1. LongTermi,c,t+1 is firm i’s long-term loan in year t+1 divided by the total liabilities 
in year t. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year-, industry-, and provincial-fixed effects are included 
in all regressions. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by city. *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var.= Subsidy_Revi,c,t+1 Subsidy_Revi,c,t+1 Leveragei,c,t+1 Leveragei,c,t+1 LongTermi,c,t+1 LongTermi,c,t+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Perk6_Revi,c,t 0.012* 0.006 0.015*** 0.012* 0.004* 0.002*** 
  (1.83) (1.25) (2.80) (1.83) (1.82) (2.63) 
Perk6_Revi,c,t×Inductioni,c,t   0.011*   0.007*   0.005*** 
    (1.90)   (1.72)   (2.63) 
Inductioni,c,t   0.030   0.009   0.004 
    (1.07)   (1.57)   (1.27) 
Dependi,c,t 0.648*** 0.648*** 0.768*** 0.769*** 0.763*** 0.762*** 
  (19.0) (19.1) (7.16) (7.16) (51.9) (52.0) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.041*** -0.041*** -0.009** -0.009** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (-2.98) (-2.99) (-2.48) (-2.48) (3.36) (3.37) 
Leveragei,c,t 0.043 0.044     0.012** 0.012** 
  (0.80) (0.83)     (2.35) (2.36) 
Duali,c,t -0.037 -0.037 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002 
  (-1.62) (-1.61) (0.89) (0.88) (0.85) (0.84) 
Indiri,c,t -0.132 -0.140 0.075 0.074 0.016 0.016 
  (-0.91) (-0.97) (1.31) (1.29) (0.78) (0.76) 
SOEi,c,t 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
  (2.90) (2.85) (0.74) (0.71) (-0.91) (-0.95) 
Insholdperi,c,t -0.012 -0.012 0.033*** 0.033*** -0.003 -0.003 
  (-0.20) (-0.20) (3.18) (3.17) (-0.53) (-0.54) 
DirHoldingi,c,t 0.003* 0.002* 0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000* 
  (1.93) (1.89) (0.57) (0.54) (-1.89) (-1.94) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.007 0.007 0.008*** 0.008*** -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.94) (0.90) (5.12) (5.06) (-0.58) (-0.60) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.047 0.047 -0.016 -0.016 -0.008 -0.008 
  (1.28) (1.28) (-1.29) (-1.31) (-1.44) (-1.46) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.024* 0.024* 0.003 0.003 -0.000 -0.000 
  (1.88) (1.96) (0.89) (0.90) (-0.030) (-0.012) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.39) (-0.35) (-2.01) (-1.98) (-0.70) (-0.68) 
GDP_Growthc,t 0.213 0.226 0.019 0.019 -0.022 -0.022 
  (1.13) (1.20) (0.47) (0.47) (-0.86) (-0.86) 
Pop_Growthc,t -0.001 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
  (-0.65) (-0.46) (3.29) (3.35) (1.49) (1.52) 
Constant 0.419 0.384 0.206** 0.202** -0.114*** -0.117*** 
  (1.65) (1.50) (2.03) (1.99) (-2.83) (-2.88) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 5716 5716 5716 5716 5716 5716 
Adj. R2 0.460  0.461  0.557  0.557  0.638  0.639  
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Table 9: The impact of perk spending on firm performance 
This table presents the results from regressions where the dependent variables are ROA i,c,t+1 and ROE i,c,t+1. All 
other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year-, industry-, and provincial-fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by city. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
Depend Var= 
ROA i,c,t+1 ROE i,c,t+1 ROA i,c,t+1 ROE i,c,t+1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Perk6_Revi,c,t 0.003 0.019 0.002 0.025 
  (0.35) (0.93) (1.35) (1.15) 
Inductionc,t     0.005*** -0.017 
      (2.81) (-0.61) 
Perk6_Revi,c,t×Inductionc,t     0.001 0.015 
      (1.07) (0.84) 
Dependi,c,t 0.546*** 0.055*** 0.546*** 0.055*** 
  (27.5) (5.75) (27.3) (5.75) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.006*** -0.003 -0.006*** -0.003 
  (-7.05) (-0.58) (-7.07) (-0.59) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.017*** -0.094* -0.017*** -0.094* 
  (-4.02) (-1.72) (-4.02) (-1.69) 
Duali,c,t -0.000 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 
  (-0.31) (-0.65) (-0.32) (-0.64) 
In_Diri,c,t 0.008 0.042 0.007 0.044 
  (0.60) (0.53) (0.54) (0.57) 
SOEi,c,t -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.004 
  (-0.89) (0.38) (-1.01) (0.43) 
Ins_Hold_Peri,c,t 0.011*** 0.037* 0.011*** 0.038* 
  (4.02) (1.87) (4.01) (1.87) 
Dir_Holdingi,c,t 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
  (1.37) (-0.74) (1.31) (-0.74) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.004*** 0.020*** 0.004*** 0.020*** 
  (6.97) (5.32) (6.98) (5.33) 
Male_CEOi,c,t -0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.006 
  (-0.45) (-0.65) (-0.46) (-0.62) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.006*** 0.017 0.006*** 0.017 
  (5.96) (1.17) (6.04) (1.18) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.000** -0.003* -0.000* -0.003 
  (-1.98) (-1.68) (-1.94) (-1.64) 
GDP_Growthc,t 0.026** -0.557 0.025** -0.556 
  (2.31) (-0.96) (2.29) (-0.95) 
Pop_Growthc,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.57) (-0.17) (-0.35) (-0.26) 
Constant 0.040* 0.157 0.037 0.162 
  (1.71) (0.68) (1.60) (0.69) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 5716 5716 5716 5716 
Adj. R2 0.364 0.027 0.364 0.027 
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Table 10: The impact of official turnover on top manager turnover 
This table presents the results of the impact of official turnover on top manager turnover over the sample period 
2003–2014. Turnover_CEOi,c,t+1 in Panel A is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the CEO of firm i is replaced 
in year t+1, and 0 otherwise. Turnover_Chairmani,c,t+1 in panel B is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
chairman of firm i is replaced in year t+1, and 0 otherwise. The regression in (1) is based on the sample of 
non-SOEs. The regressions in Column (2) is based on the sample of SOEs. Moreover, Column (3)-(5) are 
respectively the sub-sample of SOEs controlled by the central government, by the provincial government, and by 
the city government. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year-, industry-, and provincial-fixed effects 
are included in all regressions. The t-statistic reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by city. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Turnover_CEOi,c,t+1 
 
Non SOE Central SOE Provincial SOE City SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inductionc,t 0.016 -0.282 0.187 0.388*** 
  (0.17) (-1.62) (1.40) (3.11) 
Firmsizei,c,t -0.056* 0.053 0.067 -0.123** 
  (-1.75) (0.86) (0.83) (-1.98) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.087 0.199 0.734** 0.432 
  (-0.42) (0.51) (1.98) (1.15) 
ROAi,c,t -2.431*** -4.123*** -4.041*** -2.961*** 
  (-3.67) (-3.85) (-4.28) (-2.88) 
Tenure_CEOi,c,t 0.044 0.388*** 0.185*** 0.074 
  (1.05) (5.72) (2.61) (1.42) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.027 -0.297*** -0.613*** -0.029 
  (-1.09) (-2.77) (-5.71) (-0.38) 
Tenure_CEO_Squarei,c,t -0.005 -0.027*** -0.010* -0.002 
  (-1.55) (-4.16) (-1.65) (-0.55) 
Age_CEO_Squarei,c,t 0.000** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.000 
  (2.06) (3.13) (6.05) (0.53) 
STi,c,t 0.507*** 0.846*** 0.846*** 0.845*** 
  (3.66) (3.87) (4.04) (4.85) 
Gdp_Growthc,t 1.850 3.059 2.429 -0.403 
  (1.42) (1.61) (1.52) (-0.21) 
Pop_Growthc,t -3.466* 4.137* -5.053*** 0.700 
 (-1.75) (1.91) (-2.96) (0.37) 
Constant -0.300 1.770 10.153*** 0.907 
  (-0.34) (0.61) (3.09) (0.37) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 6331 2241 2605 2474 
Adj. R2 0.0412 0.0801 0.0711 0.0594 
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Panel B: Dependent variable: Turnover_Chairmani,c,t+1 
 
Non SOE Central SOE Provincial SOE City SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Inductionc,t -0.120 -0.034 0.205 0.479*** 
  (-1.18) (-0.27) (1.53) (3.22) 
Firmsizei,c,t -0.051 -0.061 -0.031 0.023 
  (-1.12) (-1.04) (-0.31) (0.32) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.132 0.399 0.290 0.117 
  (-0.50) (1.03) (0.77) (0.20) 
ROAi,c,t -3.329*** -4.964*** -5.661*** -3.409*** 
  (-3.93) (-5.60) (-4.88) (-3.22) 
Tenure_Chairmani,c,t -0.002 0.078 0.211*** 0.103* 
  (-0.055) (1.41) (3.16) (1.70) 
Age_Chairmani,c,t -0.030 -0.157 -0.773*** -0.130 
  (-0.68) (-1.39) (-5.65) (-1.27) 
Tenure_Chairman_Squarei,c,t -0.002 -0.006 -0.015*** -0.007 
  (-0.47) (-1.23) (-2.97) (-1.47) 
Age_Chairman_Squarei,c,t 0.000 0.002* 0.008*** 0.002 
  (0.96) (1.84) (6.20) (1.57) 
STi,c,t 0.960*** 0.490** 0.763*** 1.093*** 
  (7.96) (2.45) (3.26) (4.95) 
Gdp_Growthc,t -1.664 5.904*** -2.788 -5.018* 
  (-0.95) (3.32) (-1.38) (-1.87) 
Pop_Growthc,t 0.072 2.268 -0.676 2.259 
 (0.034) (1.05) (-0.47) (0.93) 
Constant 0.525 0.738 16.116*** 0.762 
  (0.32) (0.29) (4.26) (0.22) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 5820 2279 2549 2336 
Adj. R2 0.0698 0.0669 0.0948 0.0656 
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Table 11: The impact of top manager’s network on top manager turnover 
This table presents the impact of top manager’s network on top manager turnover over the sample period 2003–
2014. Turnover_CEOi,c,t+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the CEO of firm i is replaced in year t+1, and 0 
otherwise. Turnover_Chairmani,c,t+1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the chairman of firm i is replaced in 
year t+1, and 0 otherwise. The regression in (1) is based on the sample of non-SOEs. The regressions in Column (2) 
is based on the sample of SOEs. Moreover, Column (3)-(5) are respectively the sub-sample of SOEs controlled by 
the central government, by the provincial government, and by the city government. For Panel A, Friendi,c,t is a 
dummy variable, which is one if the CEO of firm i is a protégé of the current mayor or party secretary of city c, that 
is, the mayor or party secretary in the year when the CEO was appointed is still in power. Similarly, Friendi,c,t is 
defined for chairmen in Panel B. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Year-, industry-, and 
provincial-fixed effects are included in all regressions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Turnover_CEOi,c,t+1  
  
Non SOE Central SOE Provincial SOE City SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Friendi,c,t -0.088 0.109 -0.218 -0.458** 
  (-0.72) (0.46) (-0.74) (-2.03) 
Firmsizei,c,t -0.062* 0.056 0.074 -0.126** 
  (-1.91) (0.86) (0.91) (-2.05) 
Leveragei,c,t 0.042 0.186 0.780** 0.562 
  (0.21) (0.52) (2.08) (1.49) 
ROAi,c,t -2.233*** -4.055*** -4.084*** -2.842*** 
  (-3.51) (-3.98) (-4.47) (-2.75) 
Tenure_CEOi,c,t 0.042 0.402*** 0.175** 0.070 
  (1.00) (6.02) (2.36) (1.30) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.031 -0.335*** -0.520*** -0.023 
  (-1.28) (-3.90) (-3.90) (-0.31) 
Tenure_CEO_Squarei,c,t -0.005 -0.028*** -0.009 -0.002 
  (-1.61) (-4.32) (-1.43) (-0.44) 
Age_CEO_Squarei,c,t 0.001** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.000 
  (2.29) (4.41) (4.15) (0.44) 
STi,c,t 0.490*** 0.840*** 0.873*** 0.862*** 
  (3.66) (3.81) (4.15) (4.93) 
Gdp_Growthc,t 1.834 3.252* 2.460 -0.676 
  (1.51) (1.72) (1.49) (-0.36) 
Pop_Growthc,t -3.354* 4.311** -4.358** 0.106 
 (-1.74) (1.96) (-2.49) (0.056) 
Constant -0.153 2.349 8.029** 1.342 
  (-0.17) (0.96) (2.08) (0.55) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 6331 2241 2605 2474 
Adj. R2 0.0408 0.0827 0.0682 0.0553 
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Panel B: Dependent variable: Turnover_Chairmani,c,t+1  
  
Non SOE Central SOE Provincial SOE City SOE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Friendi,c,t 0.063 0.159 -0.562*** -0.418** 
  (0.43) (1.00) (-4.08) (-2.11) 
Firmsizei,c,t -0.051 -0.065 -0.018 0.028 
  (-1.12) (-1.09) (-0.19) (0.40) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.003 0.417 0.409 0.290 
  (-0.013) (1.20) (1.12) (0.48) 
ROAi,c,t -3.326*** -5.051*** -5.706*** -2.985*** 
  (-3.92) (-5.75) (-4.97) (-2.69) 
Tenure_CEOi,c,t 0.008 0.119** 0.094 0.006 
  (0.15) (2.14) (1.33) (0.081) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.036 -0.135 -0.792*** -0.118 
  (-0.78) (-1.28) (-5.60) (-1.13) 
Tenure_CEO_Squarei,c,t -0.002 -0.008* -0.010** -0.002 
  (-0.51) (-1.76) (-1.97) (-0.35) 
Age_CEO_Squarei,c,t 0.000 0.002* 0.008*** 0.001 
  (1.04) (1.76) (6.11) (1.44) 
STi,c,t 0.974*** 0.467** 0.798*** 1.118*** 
  (7.99) (2.33) (3.42) (5.11) 
Gdp_Growthc,t -1.537 6.200*** -3.300* -5.446** 
  (-0.89) (3.57) (-1.68) (-2.13) 
Pop_Growthc,t 0.300 2.449 0.034 1.745 
 (0.13) (1.24) (0.023) (0.75) 
Constant 0.458 0.099 17.064*** 1.013 
  (0.27) (0.040) (4.38) (0.29) 
Fixed effect IYP IYP IYP IYP 
N 5820 2279 2549 2336 
Adj. R2 0.0728 0.0695 0.0989 0.0625 
 
Online Appendix: Page 1 
 
 
 
Online Appendix 
 
We provide additional information about the political turnovers in Tables 1-3 and Figures 1-3.  
We report robustness checks for our main results in Tables 4-5.  
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Table 1: Distribution of city-level political turnovers by province and year 
This table presents the distribution of city-level political turnover events by province and year over the sample 
period 2003–2014 in China. 
 
Province 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Anhui 0 1 2 7 1 7 5 2 7 7 17 9 65 
Beijing  2 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 
Chongqing  3 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 9 
Fujian  1 3 3 2 3 4 2 2 4 10 8 3 45 
Gansu  0 1 4 0 0 3 2 2 0 9 3 5 29 
Guangdong  6 2 2 3 5 2 1 6 14 19 8 2 70 
Guangxi 4 0 1 1 2 4 2 3 0 6 7 3 33 
Guizhou 0 0 1 0 1 4 0 0 2 3 3 11 25 
Hainan  1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 10 
Hebei  4 2 4 1 11 7 5 2 3 7 12 2 60 
Heilongjiang  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 6 6 0 3 21 
Henan  5 8 1 4 5 6 0 0 13 11 14 10 77 
Hubei  8 1 3 2 3 4 2 1 9 3 13 1 50 
Hunan  2 1 0 2 8 3 2 0 3 6 16 2 45 
Jiangsu  7 1 6 1 0 5 0 6 6 11 7 3 53 
Jiangxi  2 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 7 0 14 32 
Jilin  1 0 3 1 5 2 0 0 6 1 1 3 23 
Liaoning 2 2 2 8 1 6 2 5 13 5 6 6 58 
Neimenggu  2 0 2 0 2 0 0 2 6 4 1 4 23 
Ningxia  1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 4 0 10 
Qinghai  0 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 3 2 0 2 13 
Shandong  9 1 0 2 17 5 0 0 9 13 9 7 72 
Shanghai 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 10 
Shanxi  0 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 2 4 3 2 20 
Shanxi(Jin)  4 1 0 12 0 4 0 1 7 8 8 2 47 
Sichuan  6 3 8 9 4 8 4 1 2 14 7 9 75 
Tianjin  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 5 
Xinjiang  3 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 11 2 6 32 
Tibet  2 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 2 0 11 
Yunnan  3 0 1 3 4 4 0 4 0 2 7 3 31 
Zhejiang  4 6 5 2 4 7 1 3 9 5 10 6 62 
Total 85 40 56 67 89 95 30 50 131 180 174 126 1123 
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Table 2: Distribution of arrested city officials by province and year 
This table presents the distribution of arrested city officials in China by province and year over the sample period 
2003–2014. 
 
Province 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
Anhui 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Beijing  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chongqing  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
Fujian  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Gansu  0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Guangdong  1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 8 
Guangxi  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guizhou  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Hainan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hebei  0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 6 
Heilongjiang  0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Henan  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 6 
Hubei  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hunan  0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
Jiangsu  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Jiangxi  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Jilin  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Liaoning 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Neimenggu  0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Ningxia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Qinghai  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Shandong  0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Shanghai 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Shanxi  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
Shanxi(Jin)  0 0 0 0 2 2 0 1 0 0 1 5 11 
Sichuan  1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 10 
Tianjin  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Xinjiang  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tibet  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yunnan  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Zhejiang  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 3 5 2 6 5 8 2 3 4 1 13 27 79 
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Table 3: Conditional probability of officials’ leaving office 
This table presents the conditional probability of officials’ leaving office. Specifically, conditional probability of 
officials’ leaving office by age is shown in Panel A, while that of their latest tenure is shown in Panel B. Moreover, 
we plot these two types of probability in Figure 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Conditional probability of leaving office by age 
This panel shows the conditional probability of leaving office grouped by the local officials’ age. Conditional 
probability of leaving office (Ratio) is calculated as the proportion of officials who leave office in certain age 
(Leaving) to the sum of officials who were in position and those who leave office in certain age (Sum). 
 
Age 
Mayor Secretary 
In position 
(1) 
Leaving 
(2) 
Sum 
(3) 
Ratio 
(4)=(2)/(3) 
In position 
(5) 
Leaving 
(6) 
Sum 
(7) 
Ratio 
(8)=(6)/(7) 
32 0 1 1 100.00%         
34         1 0 1 0.00% 
35         1 0 1 0.00% 
36         2 0 2 0.00% 
37 1 0 1 0.00% 0 2 2 100.00% 
38 2 0 2 0.00%         
39 2 0 2 0.00% 0 1 1 100.00% 
40 11 0 11 0.00%         
41 18 4 22 18.18% 1 0 1 0.00% 
42 23 6 29 20.69% 7 0 7 0.00% 
43 31 9 40 22.50% 12 1 13 7.69% 
44 33 14 47 29.79% 19 5 24 20.83% 
45 60 9 69 13.04% 29 7 36 19.44% 
46 73 36 109 33.03% 33 12 45 26.67% 
47 92 36 128 28.13% 55 10 65 15.38% 
48 109 56 165 33.94% 74 28 102 27.45% 
49 139 52 191 27.23% 103 36 139 25.90% 
50 150 63 213 29.58% 134 26 160 16.25% 
51 142 78 220 35.45% 139 54 193 27.98% 
52 117 81 198 40.91% 145 56 201 27.86% 
53 93 61 154 39.61% 140 67 207 32.37% 
54 81 37 118 31.36% 133 56 189 29.63% 
55 69 46 115 40.00% 106 66 172 38.37% 
56 57 34 91 37.36% 103 48 151 31.79% 
57 37 22 59 37.29% 77 48 125 38.40% 
58 20 20 40 50.00% 41 44 85 51.76% 
59 10 12 22 54.55% 15 28 43 65.12% 
60 5 5 10 50.00% 4 13 17 76.47% 
61 5 0 5 0.00% 2 1 3 33.33% 
62 3 1 4 25.00% 1 1 2 50.00% 
63 2 0 2 0.00% 3 0 3 0.00% 
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64 1 1 2 50.00% 2 0 2 0.00% 
65 0 1 1 100.00% 3 0 3 0.00% 
66         2 2 4 50.00% 
67         0 2 2 100.00% 
68 0 1 1 100.00%         
Total 1386 686 2072 33.11% 1387 614 2001 30.68% 
 
 
Panel B: Conditional probability of leaving office by latest tenure 
This panel shows the conditional probability of leaving office grouped by the local officials’ latest tenure, where 
the Tenure_latest is the tenure from the latest normal government succession around the meetings of the National 
People’s Congress at city level. Conditional probability of leaving office (Ratio) is calculated as the proportion 
of officials who leave office in certain age (Leaving) to the sum of officials who were in position and those who 
leave office in certain age (Sum). 
 
Tenure_latest 
Mayor Secretary 
In position 
(1) 
Leaving 
(2) 
Sum 
(3) 
Ratio 
(4)=(2)/(3) 
In position 
(5) 
Leaving 
(6) 
Sum 
(7) 
Ratio 
(8)=(6)/(7) 
1 695 207 902 22.95% 673 163 836 19.50% 
2 383 194 577 33.62% 401 164 605 27.11% 
3 204 136 352 38.64% 232 148 380 38.95% 
4 80 104 18I 56.52% 116 90 206 43.69% 
5 24 45 69 65.22% 33 49 82 59.76% 
total 1386 686 2084 32.92% 1455 614 2109 29.11% 
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Figure 1: Conditional probability of leaving office by age 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Conditional probability of leaving office by latest tenure 
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Figure 3: Distribution of officials’ age and (latest) tenure when they leave office 
This figure plots the distribution of age, tenure and latest tenure when officials leave office. Figure 3a plots the age 
of city level officials when they leave office. Figure 3b plots the tenure of city level officials when they leave office. 
Figure 3c plots the latest tenure of city level officials when they leave office, where the Tenure_latest is the tenure 
from the latest normal government succession around the meetings of the National People’s Congress at city level. 
 
Figure 3a: Age of city level officials when they leave office 
 
Figure 3b: Tenure of city level officials when they leave office 
 
Figure 3c: The latest tenure of city level officials when they leave office 
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Table 4: Controlling city fixed effects 
This table presents the results by further controlling city fixed effects in the regressions. In this table, we drop those 
cities with less than 4 listed firms. Year, industry, and city fixed effects (IYC) are included in the regressions. All 
variables are as defined in the Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
clustered by city. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Dep. Var= 
Perk6_Revi,c,t ETC_Revi,c,t Perk8_Revi,c,t Ln_Perk6i,c,t Perk6_Asseti,c,t 
Without major 
4 cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inductionc,t 0.049* 0.049** 0.035 0.099* 0.008 0.058* 
  (1.79) (2.03) (0.94) (1.94) (0.84) (1.92) 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.198*** -0.176*** -0.284*** 0.575*** -0.131*** -0.214*** 
  (-11.6) (-11.8) (-12.5) (18.2) (-21.9) (-10.8) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.414*** -0.331*** -0.709*** 0.516*** 0.260*** -0.326*** 
  (-4.88) (-4.49) (-6.28) (3.31) (8.80) (-3.44) 
ROAi,c,t -3.070*** -2.649*** -2.842*** 0.223 0.436*** -3.477*** 
  (-10.4) (-10.3) (-7.12) (0.41) (4.22) (-10.4) 
Duali,c,t 0.023 0.024 -0.008 0.016 -0.014 0.005 
  (0.68) (0.83) (-0.18) (0.27) (-1.19) (0.13) 
Indiri,c,t 0.689*** 0.384* 0.753** 0.417 0.133 0.480* 
  (2.70) (1.73) (2.27) (0.89) (1.50) (1.67) 
SOEi,c,t -0.281*** -0.216*** -0.365*** 0.056 -0.044*** -0.224*** 
  (-8.89) (-7.83) (-8.67) (0.96) (-3.98) (-6.39) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.415*** 0.388*** 0.365*** -0.047 0.051** 0.419*** 
  (6.00) (6.45) (3.89) (-0.37) (2.13) (5.31) 
DirHoldingi,c,t -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 0.001 -0.000 -0.007*** 
  (-5.15) (-5.04) (-3.31) (0.23) (-0.62) (-3.30) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.018* 0.018** -0.005 0.052*** 0.019*** 0.019* 
  (1.88) (2.12) (-0.39) (2.88) (5.50) (1.79) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.164*** 0.146*** 0.044 0.294*** 0.089*** 0.209*** 
  (3.10) (3.17) (0.64) (3.01) (4.79) (3.57) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.155*** 0.117*** 0.065** 0.209*** 0.073*** 0.143*** 
  (8.45) (7.32) (2.53) (6.18) (11.4) (6.98) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.008*** -0.003 -0.002** -0.006** 
  (-2.87) (-2.80) (-2.80) (-0.74) (-2.53) (-2.49) 
Gdp_Growthc,t 0.074 0.351 -0.051 -0.328 0.137 -0.370 
  (0.13) (0.71) (-0.056) (-0.31) (0.69) (-0.57) 
Pop_Growthc,t -0.005 -0.006 -0.000 -0.011 -0.006*** -0.002 
  (-0.76) (-1.00) (-0.026) (-0.90) (-2.64) (-0.22) 
Constant 3.258*** 3.187*** 7.679*** 3.886*** 1.862*** 4.224*** 
  (7.26) (8.16) (13.0) (4.70) (11.9) (8.24) 
Fixed effect IYC IYC IYC IYC IYC IYC 
Observations 6817 6817 5535 6817 6817 5419 
Number of cities 93 93 93 93 93 89 
R-squared 0.191 0.189 0.206 0.272 0.310 0.195 
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Table 5A: The impact of political turnover on perks: Alternative definition of Induction  
This table presents the regression results of the impact of a new measure of political turnover (Induction_newi,t) on 
perk consumptions. If a mayor or a secretary in city c takes office in month m of year t, then his/her Induction_newc,t 
equals (12-m+1) / 12, while Induction_new c,t+1 equals (m-1) / 12 in year t+1. The dependent variables are 
respectively Perk6_Revi,c,t, ETC_Revi,c,t, Perk8_Revi,c,t, Ln_Perk6i,c,t, and Perk6_Asseti,c,t in column (1)-(5). In 
column (6), we rerun the regression by dropping the “major 4” cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). 
Year, industry, regional fixed effects (IYR) are included in the regressions. All variables are as defined in the 
Appendix A. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors clustered by city. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Dep. Var= 
Perk6_Revi,c,t ETC_Revi,c,t Perk8_Revi,c,t Ln_Perk6i,c,t Perk6_Asseti,c,t 
Without major 
4 cities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Induction_Newc,t 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.118*** 0.013* 0.068*** 
  (2.80) (2.90) (2.80) (3.09) (1.83) (3.12) 
       
FirmSizei,c,t -0.202*** -0.183*** -0.282*** 0.557*** -0.133*** -0.221*** 
  (-7.23) (-7.25) (-7.85) (15.2) (-14.1) (-6.62) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.374** -0.304** -0.617*** 0.585*** 0.260*** -0.307* 
  (-2.20) (-2.10) (-3.66) (4.70) (5.10) (-1.71) 
ROAi,c,t -2.693*** -2.348*** -2.360*** 0.451 0.525*** -2.804*** 
  (-6.49) (-6.56) (-4.40) (0.91) (3.87) (-5.84) 
Duali,c,t 0.014 0.020 -0.026 -0.006 -0.004 -0.001 
  (0.22) (0.34) (-0.45) (-0.10) (-0.15) (-0.018) 
Indiri,c,t 0.781** 0.510** 0.651 0.326 0.171 0.591* 
  (2.39) (2.03) (1.44) (0.69) (1.53) (1.78) 
SOEi,c,t -0.243*** -0.187*** -0.290*** 0.086 -0.029 -0.193*** 
  (-3.93) (-3.40) (-4.13) (1.46) (-1.37) (-3.25) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.402*** 0.370*** 0.324*** -0.054 0.064* 0.430*** 
  (4.36) (4.38) (2.64) (-0.53) (1.80) (3.59) 
DirHoldingi,c,t -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.009** 0.001 -0.001 -0.006* 
  (-2.79) (-2.60) (-2.38) (0.28) (-0.53) (-1.72) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.011 0.013 -0.008 0.043*** 0.015*** 0.004 
  (0.80) (1.03) (-0.50) (2.76) (2.61) (0.24) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.162** 0.145** 0.082 0.266*** 0.097*** 0.163** 
  (2.27) (2.58) (0.72) (2.77) (4.38) (2.17) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.136*** 0.105*** 0.061* 0.205*** 0.075*** 0.112*** 
  (3.94) (3.54) (1.73) (6.10) (5.63) (3.12) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008** -0.003 -0.003*** -0.008*** 
  (-2.95) (-2.99) (-2.27) (-0.77) (-2.94) (-2.60) 
Gdp_Growthc,t 0.452 0.617 0.622 0.309 0.220 0.505 
  (0.54) (0.87) (0.81) (0.35) (0.70) (0.50) 
Pop_Growthc,t -0.272 -0.243 1.693** 0.005 -0.069 -0.997 
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  (-0.41) (-0.38) (2.30) (0.76) (-0.21) (-1.00) 
Constant 5.135*** 4.796*** 8.772*** 2.128*** 2.642*** 4.865*** 
  (6.61) (6.90) (9.60) (6.23) (10.1) (5.09) 
Fixed effect IYR IYR IYR IYR IYR IYR 
N 7935  7935  6316  7935  7935  6631  
Adj. R2 0.224 0.217 0.232 0.316 0.325 0.229 
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Table 5B: Different types of government officials’ turnover 
This table examine different types of political turnover in terms of appointing a new mayor or new communist 
party secretary for the city, as well as the results of alternative measures of Induction.. In Panel A, we examine 
the impact of appointing a new mayor, a new secretary or both in column (1)-(3). In Panel B, we change the 
definitions of government officials’ turnover. Specifically, in column (4), if a mayor is promoted from an acting 
mayor in the same city, we define the first year as the start year form an acting mayor taking office, rather 
than from a mayor taking office. In column (5), if a secretary is promoted from a mayor in the same city, we 
define the first year as the start year form a mayor taking office, rather than from her/his taking office as a 
secretary. In column (6), we include these two new definitions together in the regression. We further control 
for year, industry, and regional fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the city level in all regressions. All 
variables are as defined in the Appendix A. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var= 
Perk6_Revi.t 
Panel A: Full sample    Panel B: Alternative definition of Induction 
Mayor Secretary Both    Mayor Secretary Both 
(1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) 
Induction_Mayorc,t  
0.054***   0.049**    0.029**   0.019* 
(3.05)   (2.33)    (1.99)   (1.75) 
Induction_Secretaryc,t   
  0.033 0.016      0.035* 0.029 
  (1.59) (1.26)      (1.71) (1.25) 
                 
FirmSizei,c,t -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206***    -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** 
  (-7.48) (-7.51) (-7.49)    (-7.48) (-7.51) (-7.50) 
Leveragei,c,t -0.354** -0.354** -0.353**    -0.355** -0.354** -0.354** 
  (-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.13)    (-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.14) 
ROAi,c,t -2.677*** -2.673*** -2.677***    -2.673*** -2.671*** -2.673*** 
  (-6.45) (-6.44) (-6.45)    (-6.44) (-6.44) (-6.44) 
Duali,c,t 0.013 0.013 0.013    0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)    (0.21) (0.20) (0.21) 
Indiri,c,t 0.795** 0.800** 0.795**    0.795** 0.800** 0.798** 
  (2.59) (2.59) (2.59)    (2.59) (2.59) (2.59) 
SOEi,c,t -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.242***    -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.242*** 
  (-3.95) (-3.95) (-3.96)    (-3.95) (-3.96) (-3.96) 
Insholdperi,c,t 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.412***    0.413*** 0.412*** 0.412*** 
  (4.38) (4.36) (4.37)    (4.38) (4.36) (4.36) 
DirHoldingi,c,t -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009***    -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (-2.75) (-2.74) (-2.75)    (-2.74) (-2.74) (-2.74) 
Analystsi,c,t 0.012 0.012 0.012    0.012 0.012 0.012 
  (0.85) (0.88) (0.86)    (0.85) (0.87) (0.87) 
Male_CEOi,c,t 0.164** 0.164** 0.164**    0.164** 0.164** 0.164** 
  (2.35) (2.35) (2.36)    (2.36) (2.35) (2.35) 
Salary_CEOi,c,t 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.139***    0.138*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
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  (4.12) (4.10) (4.12)    (4.11) (4.10) (4.10) 
Age_CEOi,c,t -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007***    -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (-2.98) (-2.99) (-2.98)    (-2.99) (-3.00) (-2.99) 
Gdp_Growthc,t 0.521 0.549 0.520    0.544 0.546 0.538 
  (0.64) (0.67) (0.64)    (0.67) (0.67) (0.66) 
Pop_Growthc.t 0.001 0.000 0.001    0.000 0.000 0.001 
  (0.18) (0.059) (0.19)    (0.10) (0.064) (0.12) 
Constant 4.696*** 4.710*** 4.696***    4.700*** 4.709*** 4.702*** 
  (7.51) (7.56) (7.53)    (7.52) (7.56) (7.54) 
Fixed effect IYR IYR IYR    IYR IYR IYR 
N 7935 7935 7935    7935 7935 7935 
Adj. R2 0.225 0.224 0.225    0.224 0.224 0.224 
 
